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I. INTRODUCTION

The average Englishman's habits of reserve and regard for his own privacy are
legendary.' It is surprising, therefore, that English courts have, until very recently,
shown great reluctance to recognize privacy as an interest worthy of legal
protection in its own right.' The experience of other common law countries has
not been the same; privacy law has flourished in the United States' and has gained
a foothold in Australia 4 and Canada.5 Moreover, a right to privacy has received
international recognition in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,6 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7 and the European
*Law clerk to the Hon Henry J. Friendly, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I
thank the Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy for its generous assistance
in the completion of this article.
x An opinion survey ranking privacy concerns most important among 'social issues' (including race
and sex discrimination, free speech and free press) was conducted in 1971 for the Younger
Committee. See Report of the Committee on Privacy (HMSO 1972) Cmnd 5012, Appendix E at
230 (Sir Kenneth Younger, Chairman) (hereinafter cited as 'Younger Committee'). For more
impressionistic accounts from the past, see e.g. J. Gloag, The Englishman'sCastle (i944) 4; Aide,
'English Criticism of American Society' 8 Our Day 94, l1 (1891); Cobbe, 'The Love of
Notoriety' 8 Forum 170, 174-75 (1889); Thomas, 'An Englishman's Castle' 4 Household Words
321, 323 (1851); 'The English, the Scots, and the Irish' Eur Rev (Oct 1824) 63. One social
historian has identified the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the period of greatest advance
in privacy interests at all levels of society. See L. Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in
England, 15oo-18oo (1977) 253-57, 395.
2 See e.g. Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] Ch 344, 357 (opinion of
Sir Robert Megarry V-C citing 8 Halsbury'sLaws of England 4 th ed (974) 557, para 843); Re X
(a minor)[1975] Fain 47, 58 (opinion of Lord Denning MR) 'We have as yet no general remedy for
infringement of privacy. .. .'; Younger Committee, supra n i, para 83.
3 See e.g. 'Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights' 95 Harv
L Rev 1324, 1430-44 (1982) (ambit of privacy protection in State courts); infra 330-331.
4 See e.g. E. Campbell and H. Whitmore, Freedom in Australia 2nd ed (1973) 372-75; J. Fleming,
The Law of Torts 5 th ed (19 7 7 ) 59o-96; infra 368.
5 See e.g. D. Gibson ed, Aspects of Privacy Law (198o); Burns, 'Law and Privacy: The Canadian
Experience' 54 Can B Rev 1 (1976); infra 367-368.
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted io December 1948, GA Res 21 7 A, 3 UN GAOR,
c 3 Annexes (Agenda Item 58) 535, 536-41, UN Doc A/8ii at 71 (1948) (hereinafter cited as
'Universal Declaration'). Article iz provides: 'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.... .' See infra 350.
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted i6 December 1966, entered into
force 23 March 1976, GA Res 22ooA, 21 UN GAOR, Supp (No 16) 52, UN Doe A/6 3 16 (1966)
(hereinafter cited as 'International Covenant'). Article 17 substantially repeats Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration, supra n 6. See infra 350-351.
325
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Convention on Human Rights. 8 Yet in England, Parliament has refused on a
number of occasions to enact broad privacy protections, 9 and the courts have been
slow to find a grounding for privacy in the common law and in constitutional
principles as the American courts have done.10 Judicial pronouncements in the
past few years, however, have come closer and closer to recognition of a general
privacy interest protected at common law as one of the rights of every English
subject.11 It is instructive to compare the state of American law on the verge of its
acceptance of a right to privacy.
When, in 289o, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published their now
famous article entitled 'The Right to Privacy', 2 American courts had already
recognized a legally protected interest in personal privacy in a number of
contexts. 13 Doctrines of trespass, eavesdropping, defamation, unreasonable search
and seizure, sanctity of the mails, and confidentiality of census information were
among those extended by State and Federal courts to protect what they explicitly
denominated the 'privacy' of the individual. 14 Warren and Brandeis wanted the
courts to carry this existing protection one step further, to restrain the publication
of truthful information of a personal nature (in particular of candid photographs)
in the newspaper press.15 The gradual extension of legal doctrines toward greater
protection of privacy had stopped short at restraint of the newspapers because the
8 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, Cmnd 8969 (953)

(hereinafter cited as 'European Convention').

Article 8(1) provides: 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.' See infra 351-353, 365-366.
9 See e.g. Right of Privacy Bill i961, introduced 228 HansardHL (5th ser) 716 (1961); Right of
Privacy Bill 1967, introduced 740 HansardHC (5 th ser) 1565 (1967); Right of Privacy Bill 1969,
introduced 787 HansardHC(5th ser) 1519 (1969); infra 346-347.
io See e.g. Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) (recognizing a 'penumbral' constitutional
right to privacy), Pavesich v New EnglandLife Ins Co 122 Ga 190, 50 SE 68 (1905) (recognizing
a common law right to privacy in tort).
ii See e.g. Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Dep't [1982] 2 WLR 338, 351, 358, 363
(opinions of Lord Roskill, and Lord Scarman dissenting) dismissing appeal from Home Office v
Harman [1981] QB 534, 557, 558 (opinions of Lord Denning MR and Templeman LJ), Morris v
Beardmore [1981] AC 446, 462, 464-65, 465 (opinions of Lord Keith, Lord Scarman and Lord
Roskill), Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [198o] AC 952, 997, 1019, 1022

(opinions of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Scarman, and of Lord Salmon, dissenting), R v
Grossman (198) 73 Crim App R 302, 308, 309 (opinions of Shaw and Oliver LJJ), Schering
Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB i, 21 (Lord Denning MR dissenting in part), R v
Thornley (1980) 72 Crim App R 302, 306 (opinion of Dunn LJ), R v Crown Court at Sheffield, ex
parte Brownlow [198o] QB 530, 542 (opinion of Lord Denning MR), R v Adams [198o] i QB
575, 579 - 8o, 583 (opinion of Cumming-Bruce LJ), Thermax Ltd v Schott Industrial Glass Ltd
(1980) 7 Fleet Street R 289, 298 (opinion of Browne-Wilkinson J), Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB
128, 134 (opinion of Donaldson LJ). See also R v Withers, The Times 17 June 1971, at I, col 2
(opinion of Roskill J). See generally infra 353-362.
12 Warren and Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' 4 HarvL Rev 193 (189o).
13 See Note, 'The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America' 94 Harv L Rev 1892 (1981).
14 See ibid., x895-909.
15 See ibid., 1893, 19o9-o; Warren and Brandeis, supra n 2, 196, 2o6, 213.
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competing interest of freedom of the press had a secure constitutional niche and
zealous advocates of its own. A catalyst was needed, other than the steady
pressure of litigants seeking to vindicate their invaded privacy, and the article by
Warren and Brandeis provided that catalyst.
In England, however, scholarly legal periodicals did not have this creative effect.
Spurred on by calls for the recognition of a right to privacy from Canadian' 6 and
Australian 7 legal writers, Percy H. Winfield contributed an article to the Law
Quarterly Review in 193118 strongly urging the House of Lords to enunciate a
general right of this kind in a case then before it, Tolley v J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd.' 9
The Law Lords instead exercised their imaginations to devise a remedy in
defamation for the plaintiff, who had been the subject of caricature in a newspaper
advertisement.2" Since the failure of the Winfield article, English legal writers have
looked to Parliament rather than to the courts for the initiative in this field.2' In
Parliament, however, the organized power of the newspaper press has been the
chief obstacle to enactment of a broad right to privacy. 22 A further obstacle has
been the effort of some legal scholars to demonstrate the intellectual bankruptcy of
the 'concept' of privacy. 23 Engendered in part by the alarm felt by English lawyers
at the great breadth of privacy law in the United States, this attempt at
obfuscation has not deterred recent English courts from building up piecemeal the
broad right rejected in the Tolley case, by making frequent and explicit references
24
to 'privacy' as the value they are concerned to protect.
This article traces the treatment of privacy in the English courts from the
16 See Falconbridge, 'Desirable Changes in the Common Law' 5 Can B Rev 581, 602-05 (1927)
proposing a common law 'right to privacy' protecting one's 'face, personal appearance, sayings,
acts and personal relations' subject to some reservation in favour of the public interest.
17 See 'The Unauthorised Use of Portraits' 3 AustralianLY 359, 359 (1930) suggesting for Tolley v
J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd a remedy 'against persons or corporations who, without authority, make
use of another's name or portrait for advertising purposes'.
i8 See Winfield, 'Privacy' 47 LQ Rev 23 (1931). The lack of a legal remedy for press invasions of
privacy had been noted in lay periodicals. See e.g. Ervine, 'The Invasion of Privacy' 138
Spectator 937 (1927).
19 In the Court of Appeal, Tolley v Y. S. Fry & Sons Ltd [1930] 1 KB 467, 478, Greer LJ
announced his regret at having to overturn the jury award of damages, adding that 'the
defendants in publishing the advertisement in question, without first obtaining Mr Tolley's
consent, acted in a manner inconsistent with the decencies of life, and in so doing they were
guilty of an act for which there ought to be a legal remedy'.
20 [1931] AC 333.
21 See e.g. Dworkin, 'Privacy and the Press' 24 Mod L Rev 185, x88-89 (i961); Yang, 'Privacy: A
Comparative Study of English and American Law' 15 Int'l & Comp LQ 175, x88 (1966); infra
345.
22 See e.g. sources cited infra nn 167, 174 and 183. See also Press Council, Policy Statement on
Privacy, quoted in The Times 12 April 1976, at 4, col I ('[A]ny attempt to legislate on privacy
would be contrary to the public interest'); infra 345-347.
23 See e.g. Neill, 'The Protection of Privacy' 25 Mod L Rev 393 (1962); Wacks, 'The Poverty of
"Privacy"' 96 LQ Rev 73 (198o). Professor Wacks' exposition of this argument can also be found
in his book The Protection of Privacy(i98o), 10-23.
24 See cases cited supra n ix; infra 353-362.
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beginning of the nineteenth century to the present day. It attempts to set out the
current status of judicial protection of privacy in England and to compare the
experiences of the Scottish, Canadian, Australian, South African, and Indian
courts with that of England's on the subject of privacy. First, however, the
definitional difficulties posed by many legal scholars must be dealt with and a
working definition of privacy must be proposed; Part II considers this problem of
the definition of privacy. Part III then takes the history of privacy in the English
courts up to the beginning of the twentieth century. In Part IV two proposed
alternatives to judicial recognition-parliamentary enactment of a right to privacy
and domestication of international protections-are briefly outlined. Part V traces
the recent judicial initiatives approaching full recognition of a right to privacy, and
Part VI provides an analytical and comparative overview of the English courts'
protection of individual privacy.
II.

THE DEFINITION OF PRIVACY

A. The definitionalquagmire
Warren and Brandeis, in their x890 article, had not thought it necessary to define
exactly what they meant by a 'right to privacy', other than to equate it with Judge
Thomas M. Cooley's formulation 'the right to be let alone' 25 and their own phrase,
'inviolate personality'.26 Their aim was the narrower one of advocating what they
termed 'the right to protect oneself from pen portraiture, from a discussion by the
press of one's private affairs'. 2 This narrower right against the press was hedged
about with many of the same limitations as was the right to reputation protected
by the tort of defamation.2 8 An American magazine editor, writing shortly before
Warren and Brandeis, defined the interest in privacy more broadly as 'the value
attached ... to the power of drawing, each man for himself, the line between his
life as an individual and his life as a citizen, or in other words, the power of
deciding how much or how little the community shall see of him, or know of
him'.29 This x890 definition of privacy embodies the concept of individual control
over information about30oneself central to the now widely accepted formulation of
Professor Alan Westin.
Early discussions of the law of privacy in England showed equally little interest
25 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 2nd ed (1888) 29.
26 Warren and Brandeis, supra n I2, 205.
27 Ibid., 213.
28 Ibid., 214-x8.

29 Godkin, 'The Rights of the Citizen. IV.-To His Own Reputation' 8 Scribner'sMagazine 58, 65
(189o). Warren and Brandeis did quote in passing a similar notion expressed in an English
decision of 1769: '[Ejvery man has a right to keep his own sentiments' and 'a right to judge
whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends'. Millar v
Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303, 2379, 98 Eng Rep 2o1, 242 (Yates J dissenting).
30 See A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) 7 ('Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others').
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in sophisticated attempts at precise legal definition.3' In suggesting that 'offensive
invasion of the personal privacy of another is (or ought to be) a tort', Professor
Winfield had defined 'infringement of privacy' as 'unauthorized interference with a
person's seclusion of himself or of his property from the public'.32 By mid-century,
English lawyers had a wealth of American judicial definitions from which to
choose, 33 as well as the formulation of the International Society of Jurists (this
remarkably similar to Judge Cooley's). 34 The effort to deny the possibility of any
coherent definition of privacy did not begin in England35 until attention turned to
the possibility of Parliamentary enactment of a statutory right. 36 Proposed
statutory language proved much more susceptible to attack on definitional
grounds than did the imagined pronouncements of future courts.
Sir Kenneth Younger's Committee on Privacy issued its Report in 1972
advising against enactment of a general right to privacy. 37 In assessing competing
claims to privacy and to free flow of information, the Committee majority found
one major difficulty to be the 'lack of any clear and generally agreed definition of
what privacy itself is'. 38 By way of reply to this objection, Professor D. N.
MacCormick pointed out that the enactment of a right 'is a fundamentally
different procedure and process from the elucidation of a concept', and that, in any
case, the difficulty of choice among alternative definitions is not a particularly
good reason not to choose.39 Since then, the project of formulating a coherent legal
31 See infra 331-333.

See Winfield, supra n 18, 24.
33 See Neill, supran 23, 396-97.
34 See International Commission of Jurists, Conclusions of the Nordic Conference on the Right to
Privacy z- 3 (1967), quoted in 'The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative Study' 24 Int'l
32

Soc SciJ 417 , 420 (1972).
35 For the earliest American (and Australian) critiques, see e.g. Davis, 'What Do We Mean by
"Right to Privacy"?' 4 SD L Rev (x959); Dworkin, 'The Common Law Protection of Privacy' 2
U Tas L Rev 418 (1967); Kalven, 'Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?'
31 Law & Contemp Problems 326 (1966).
36 Compare 229 Hansard HL ( 5th ser) 625-30 (196i) (remarks of Lord Kilmuir LC) (definitional
difficulties of the Right of Privacy Bill) with Winfield, supra n 18; Paton, 'Broadcasting and
Privacy' i6 Can B Rev 425, 437 (1938); and 'Privacy and the Law' 228 Law Times 233 (1959)
(discussions relatively innocent of definitional considerations).
37 See Younger Committee, supra n i.
38 Ibid., para 658.
39 MacCormick, 'Privacy: A Problem of Definition?' i Brit J L & Soc'y 75 (1974). See also Baxter,
'Privacy in Context: Principles Lost or Found?' 8 Cambrian L Rev 7, 9 (i977) ('[Ilt is not a
definition which is needed but a general right, since otherwise the ingenuity of the modem
invader of privacy cannot be taken into account .... [A] definition in the comprehensive sense is
neither possible nor necessary.')
Another basis for the majority's conclusion was that Parliamentary legislation 'has not been
the way in which English law in recent centuries has sought to protect the main democratic
rights of citizens', in particular, the rights of free speech and assembly. Professor MacCormick
took issue with the Committee on its analogy between 'liberties' such as free speech and the
'claim-right' of privacy, concepts differentiated by Wesley Hohfeld's analytical categories.
MacCormick, 'A Note upon Privacy' 89 LQ Rev 23 (1973). MacCormick's attack drew a reply
from minority member Norman Marsh, saying essentially that the Committee knew what they
were doing. Marsh, 'Hohfeld and Privacy' 89 LQ Rev 183 (i973).
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definition of privacy has been undertaken by very able scholars in American and
Australian legal journals. 40 The problem that the Younger Committee saw as
definitional-how to set limits on a right to privacy when it conflicts with other
important interests-was really a problem of lawmaking in a new area.
Legislators can provide guidance for the courts, and they occasionally do so in
great detail; but legislators cannot expect total precision. 4 ' Nevertheless, the
argument that privacy is incapable of definition, or at any rate not worth defining,
has reappeared recently in a Law Quarterly Review article by Raymond Wacks
entitled 'The Poverty of "Privacy;" .42 Wacks urges that the concept 'be refused
admission to English law', 43 and his reasons are worth examining in some detail.
Wacks finds the debate over contending definitions of privacy to be 'sterile'
because scholars proposing definitions rarely agree on their premises or objectives,
and 'futile' because where privacy is recognized, it simply means whatever the
legislatures and courts say it means.44 Neither of these objections goes to the
impossibility of defining privacy; together, they would seem to indicate only that
the confusion among legal scholars has not forestalled the continued use of the
concept in courts and legislatures. Wacks relies more heavily on the argument that
in America and in England privacy has become 'almost irretrievably confused'
with a number of other legal concepts. On the constitutional level, the US
Supreme Court has expanded the notion of privacy, in the area of sexual freedom,
to be synonymous with individual autonomy 'or, indeed, with freedom itself;
moreover, the Court has characterized unreasonable searches, forced disclosure of
membership in associations and prohibitions on the possession of obscene matter
as invasions of privacy." The common law tort of privacy in America has,
according to Wacks, become confused with defamation and with the proprietary
interest in one's name and likeness. 46 In England, privacy has become entangled
with the action for breach of confidence-a protection of trade secrets as well as
intimate personal details-and has been confused more generally with
governmental claims to secrecy.4" Finally, in both countries, computerized
information collection has been labelled a privacy problem.4" Wacks concludes that
49
he would replace this overworked word with the phrase 'personal information'.
The definitional argument put forward by Wacks is probably representative of
the fears of many English lawyers opposed to legal recognition of a right to
40 See Gavison, 'Privacy and the Limits of Law' 89 Yale LY 421 (x98o); Benn, 'The Protection and

Limitation of Privacy' (Parts I & 2) 52 AustralianLU 6ox, 686 (1978).
41 See e.g. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (196i) 124-25 (open texture of rules); W. Twining
and D. Miers, How toDo Things with Rules (1976) 1io- is (same).
42 See Wacks, supra n 23.

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Ibid., 74.
Ibid., 75-77.
Ibid., 79-81.
Ibid., 83-86.
Ibid., 81-83.
Ibid., 86-87.
Ibid., 88-89.
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privacy." It is the uneasy feeling that privacy law in the United States has run
rampant and has intruded into older, settled categories of the law. It is not a
jurisprudential argument that the word 'privacy' is somehow less capable of
bearing definite legal meanings than, say, such overworked words as
'reasonableness' or 'property'." It is also not a policy argument that people
claiming invasions of their privacy are just using that vocabulary to camouflage
underlying, illegitimate interests. 2 Wacks's argument appears to concede that
people genuinely want privacy, and even that legal protection of individual privacy
may be appropriate where it is incidental to relief for defamation or breach of
confidence. But Wacks recoils at the twin prospects of, first, a wave of uncertainty
as injuries that would have been remedied by an established doctrine such as
defamation are brought to court under a new untested right to privacy, and
secondly, a flood of unprecedented litigation as injuries that would not have been
remedied at all under existing English law are brought to court for the first time.
Such fear of the unknown has often been voiced before in opposition to proposed
new remedies in the common law, remedies that seemed to burst the bounds of
established legal categories. 3 The objection is a weighty one, but it does not go to
the problem of definition as such.
B. Toward a pragmaticlegal definition of privacy
As will be demonstrated in the main sections of this article, English courts since at
least the mid-nineteenth century, and quite frequently of late, have made reference
to a legally protectible interest in 'privacy' and even to a 'right to privacy' in
limited contexts. No elaborate or technical definition of privacy is required to
interpret and understand these judicial pronouncements. To the extent that the4
English judiciary had any theoretical framework for their discussion of privacy,1
50 See e.g. W. Pratt, Privacy in Britain (1979) 2o6-07 ('A concept flexible enough to comprise

51
52

53

54

opposite ideas is not a likely subject for legislation.'); Taylor, 'Privacy and the Public' 34 Mod L
Rev 288, 289-9o (i97).
See e.g. G. Paton in G. Paton and D. Derham, A Textbook of Jurisprudence4 th ed (972) 531-36
(ambiguity of the term 'property' in modern English law).
This view has been taken in R. Posner, The Economics of Justice 232-34 (i98i). For a response,
see Englard, Book Review 95 Harv L Rev 1162, 1177 (1982).
See e.g. Reynolds v Clarke (1726) 1 Strange 634, 635, 93 Eng Rep 747, 748 (opinion of Lord
Raymond CJ opposing the use of case for a trespass) 'We must keep up the boundaries of actions,
otherwise we shall introduce the utmost confusion'; YB Mich z Hen 7, fo 30, pI 5 (1504)
(argument of Pigot opposing the use of assumpsit for debt) '[O]ne can never have an action on
the case where one can have another action at common law. . . .'; Watkin's Case (1425) YB Hil 3
Hen 6, fo 36, pl 33 (opinion of Martin J opposing the use of assumpsit for an unsealed covenant)
'[I]f this action be maintainable ... for every broken covenant in the world a man shall have an
action of trespass....
On the difficulty of measuring the influence of contemporary economic and philosophical trends
on the nineteenth century judiciary see P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract
(I979) 370-74 (influence of Mill's political economy and Benthamite utilitarianism at
mid-century).
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it was the philosophical debate begun by J. S. Mill and later developed by Stephen
and Montague.55 'There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective
opinion with individual independence', wrote Mill in his essay On Liberty,56 a
limit he formulated elsewhere as 'a circle around every individual human being,
which no government ... ought to be permitted to overstep', or 'some space in
human existence thus entrenched around, and sacred from authoritative
intrusion'." By interference and intrusion Mill meant coercion as well as invasion
of privacy, but even critics of Mill's broader principle of non-interference, among
them James Fitzjames Stephen, conceded to Mill that '[1]egislation and public

opinion ought in all cases whatever scrupulously to respect privacy'.5" A pragmatic
legal definition of privacy attempts to discover what that limit has been in
different historical periods by reconstructing the different 'boundaries' asserted by
litigants and judges in cases explicitly mentioning privacy as the interest
protected.
Stephen, writing before he himself became a judge, recognized that '[t]o define
the province of privacy distinctly is impossible'. 9 A claim to privacy, if it is to be
treated seriously, must be accepted at face value. To purport to dig behind such a
claim for the 'real' interest being protected-hypothesizing sexual prudishness in
some cases, concealment of commercially valuable information in others, disdain
for inquisitive social inferiors in still others-is a fundamentally misguided
approach. An assertion of a privacy interest, if successful, will conceal forever the
nature of the information sought to be kept private. Different people value their
privacy to different degrees, and for different reasons.60 It is possible, nevertheless,
to find a general consensus on what facets of personal life are within the ambit of
Mill's limit. As Stephen concluded, while precise definition is impossible, '[t]he
55 At a jurisprudential level, the debate remains very much alive in twentieth century England. See
P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965), H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963).
56 J. S. Mill, On Liberty 63 (ist ed London 1859) (G. Himmelfarb ed 1974). Mill was quick to admit
that 'the practical question where to place that limit-how to make the fitting adjustment
between individual independence and social control-is a subject on which nearly everything
remains to be done'. Ibid.
57 J. S. Mill, Principlesof PoliticalEconomy 306 (ist ed London 1848) (D. Winch ed 1970). Mill
may not have dared mention privacy explicitly after his editing of Jeremy Bentham's Rationale of
JudicialEvidence, in which the concept is roundly traduced at prodigious length. See J. S. Mill,
ed, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (London 1827), in J. Bowring, ed, The Works of Jeremy
Bentham (1843) vol 6, 187, 351-8o [hereinafter cited as 'Works'].
58 J. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 16o (ist ed 1873) (R. White ed 1967). See also F.
Montague, The Limits of IndividualLiberty (1885) 196 '[A] public opinion which did not respect
the privacies of life would make life intolerable to all men
59 J. Stephen, supra n 58, 16o.
6o See e.g. 'The Taste for Privacy and Publicity' 61 Spectator 782 (1888); 'Secrecy' 6o New
Monthly Magazine 224 (1840). The pragmatic approach to a definition of privacy recognizes that
claims to privacy are never absolute, but are made for the very reason that some strong opposing
interest is already in sight. This recognition avoids the philosophical objection that total and
perfect privacy would be humanly intolerable.
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common usage of language affords a practical test which is almost perfect upon
this subject'.61
Three sets of 'boundaries', broadly construed, knit together the explicitly
denominated 'privacy' interests asserted in the English courts over the course of
the nineteenth century and up to the present day. The first of these are the
physical boundaries around private property, in particular the dwelling house of
every individual or family. 62 Such boundaries create a three-dimensional 'private
space' given legal protection against some (but certainly not all) unwanted
intrusions of outsiders. They are also barriers to the penetration of legal analysis:
the interest in the privacy of private property may be asserted to prevent intruders
from seeing something, from hearing something, or just from rendering the
occupants uncomfortable. To the extent that the law respects these boundaries,
the motive of concealment behind them is irrelevant. The amount of available
legal protection will vary according to other factors, including the means of
intrusion and the official or unofficial status of the intruder.
The second set of boundaries, those marking out confidential
communications,63 are less tangible than the physical boundaries of private
property. Property in the contents of a literary work is a concept familiar to the
common law, one capable of extension to the contents of a diary and a personal
letter. A property basis for the protection of telephone conversations or face-toface communication is more difficult to imagine. Grounded on a variety of legal
doctrines, protections of confidentiality are sometimes dependent on the means of
communications employed, sometimes on the relationship between the speakers.
Like the protections of physical property, they are never treated as absolute
barriers to disclosure.
Thirdly, and least tangible of all, are the boundaries around personal
information concerning private individuals, 64 information that may be inchoate
and unexpressed until reduced to gossip or dossier by the invasion of privacy.
Again, the boundaries are permeable and the protections they afford are variously
grounded. Information about which a person could not be compelled to testify
may be given up by that person for statistical, financial, or medical purposes on
the understanding, enforceable by law, that the information shall not be used for
any other purpose. There is also some legal recourse if personal information is
published broadly to the subject's embarrassment or annoyance, through
extensions of the law of defamation and that of breach of confidence. As in the era
of Warren and Brandeis, this set of boundaries is the focus of the greatest concern
65
and the greatest uncertainty.
It should be obvious that the three sets of boundaries just described can
61 J. Stephen, supra n 58, 16o.
62 See infra 334-337, 353-357. The division into spheres of influence does not provide a complete
solution. See J. Lucas, The Principlesof Politics(1966) 182.
63 See infra 337-341 , 357-359.
64 See infra 341-345, 359-362.
65 See Note, supra n 13.
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sometimes offer overlapping protection to a unitary interest in privacy. Personal
information may be communicated confidentially within the private property of
the subject. If, for example, a husband communicates some matter of great
delicacy concerning himself to his wife in the bedroom of their home, the law may
afford protection from physical or mechanical eavesdroppers on the basis of
private property, while it may allow the wife to refuse to testify to (and permit the
husband to enjoin the wife from publishing) the confidential communication, and
moreover it may shield the husband from forced disclosure himself on the basis of
personal information. In evolving all of these legal protections, however, English
courts have treated the categories as distinct ones, and have applied the language
of privacy to all three.
III.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH LAW OF PRIVACY

A. Privateproperty
For Sir William Blackstone, the core of the institution of property was the ability
to exclude others," and no other species of property was so well hedged about
with legal guarantees of exclusiveness as the dwelling house. 7 At the outset of the
nineteenth century, that bulwark of Parliamentary rhetoric," the popular maxim
'an Englishman's house is his castle' summed up three lines of legal doctrine
defending the householder against intruders. In its original application, the maxim
embodied a broad privilege of self-defence for the occupant who met a felonious
assault with deadly force. 9 According to Sir Edward Coke in Semayne's Case, a
man's house was his castle 'as well for his safety as for his repose', 70 and therefore
no sheriff executing a creditor's writ of attachment could break down the door to
66 W. Blackstone, Commentarieson the Laws of England (Oxford 1765-1769), vol 2, 4.
67 Blackstone, op cit, supra, vol 4, 223.
68 See 15 Parl Hist Eng 1307 (1763) (remarks of William Pitt). There is no official record of the
much quoted version of this speech: 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the
storm may enter-the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter -all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenementI'; H. Brougham, HistoricalSketches of
Statesmen Who Flourished in the Time of George II (London 1839) 1 ser, 41-42. See also A.
Dalrymple, ParliamentaryReform 2nd ed (London 1792) io- i (continued veneration of the
maxim in a time of conservative reaction to the French Revolution); W. Young, The British
Constitution of Government 2nd ed (London 1793) (same). For an earlier objection to excisemen
entering dwelling-houses, using much the same rhetoric, see 8 Parl Hist Eng (1733) 1317-i8
(remarks of Sir John Barnard).
69 See YB Mich 21 Hen 7, fo 39, p1 50 (1499). On' the dating of this case to 1499, see Baker,
'Introduction' in 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman i68 (Selden Soc'y 94, J. Baker ed 1978).
70 Semayne's Case (16o5) 5 Co Rep 9ia, 9 ib, 77 Eng Rep 194, 195. Coke used the maxim on many
other occasions, sometimes with stronger privacy overtones. See e.g. The Case of the King's
Prerogativein Saltpetre (i6o6) 12 Co Rep I2, 13, 77 Eng Rep 1294, 1296 (Serjeants' Inn) (Royal

ministers mining for this strategic resource could not dig under any houses) '[M]y house is the
safest place for my refuge, safety and comfort, and of all my family; ... and it is very necessary
for the weal public, that the habitation of subjects be preserved and maintained'.
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gain entrance. 7 By the 176os and 177os, moreover, the Court of Common Pleas
was protecting the subject's castle against the king himself, by striking down
general search warrants72 and upholding large fines against revenue agents who
committed unlawful trespass.73
The nineteenth century Englishman thus had legitimate recourse to physical
violence in defence of the dwelling house, as well as a legal remedy in trespass.
Violent self-help could only be justified when a threat to the occupants' physical
safety was feared,74 but the popular imagination took the law of self-defence much
further in this regard, 75 to protection of 'the privacy and security that [made]
possible all life, industry, and order'. 76 Courts applied the trespass remedy to all
unwelcome intrusions, howsoever motivated. 7 Exemplary damages of £500 were
awarded in one trespass case of 1814, for ungentlemanly conduct likened by the
court to that of an intruder who 'walks up and down before the window of [one's]
house, and looks in while the owner is at dinner'. 78 The high value placed by the
71 See Burdett v Abbott (181I) 14 East I, 154-55, 104 Eng Rep 5O1, 560, aff'd, (1812) 4 Taun 401,
128 Eng Rep 384, Ratcliffe v Burton (18o2) 3 Bos & PUl 223, 229, 127 Eng Rep 123, 126 (once
the outer door is passed, a sheriff must still request the owner to open inner doors and chests
before using force).
72 See Entick v Carrington(1765) 19 Howell St Tr io29, io66, 2 Wils KB 275, 291-92, 95 Eng Rep
807, 817-18, Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft i, 18, 98 Eng Rep 489, 498, Huckle v Money (1763) 2
Wils KB 205, 207, 95 Eng Rep 768, 769.
73 See Bruce v Rawlins (1770) 3 Wils KB 61, 62, 95 Eng Rep 934, 934 (opinion of Lord Wilmot CJ)
'This is an unlawful entry into a man's house (which is his castle), an invasion upon his wife and
family at peace and quietness therein, frightened and surprised by these defendants; who under
pretence of information received, and colour of legal authority, demand the keys of, and search all
the boxes and drawers in the house'; Bostock v Saunders (1773) 2 W BI 912, 214, 96 Eng Rep
539, 540, overruled by Cooper v Booth (1785) 3 Esp 135, 17o Eng Rep 564, 1 TR 535, 99 Eng
Rep 1238.
74 See Meade's Case (1823) i Lewin CC 184, 185, 168 Eng Rep ioo6, ioo6 (instructions of Holroyd
J) 'A civil trespass will not excuse the firing of a pistol at a trespasser.... .'; R v Scully (1824) I
Car & P 319 , 319-20, 171 Eng Rep 1213, 1213 (servant's shooting of trespasser in garden or yard
only justified if servant's life endangered); Dakin's Case (1828) 1 Lewin CC I66, 167, 168 Eng
Rep 999, iooo (instructions of Bayley J) 'If the prisoner had known of the back-way, it would
have been his duty to have gone out. .. .'); Wild's Case (1837) 2 Lewin CC 214, 214, 168 Eng
Rep 1132, 1132 (instructions of Alderson B) 'A kick is not a justifiable mode of turning a man out
of your house . . .'. For later cases moderating the householder's defence, see R v Symondson
(1896) 6o JP 645, 646 (instructions of Kennedy J) 'You must not shoot a trespasser merely
because he is a trespasser'; R v Dennis (1905) 69 JP 256, 256 'It may be an unlawful act if the
person deliberately fires at the burglar'.
75 See e.g. R v Moir (1830) 72 Ann Reg 344, 347 (unsuccessful claim 'my land is my castle');
'Shooting Burglars' 76 SaturdayRev 534, 534-35 (1893) (advice from Willes J).
76 J. Paterson, Commentarieson the Liberty of the Subject and the Laws of EnglandRelating to the
Security of the Person (1877), vol 1, 355
77 Entick v Carrington(1765) 19 Howell St Tr 1029, io66, 2 Wils KB 275, 291, 95 Eng Rep 807,
817 (opinion of Lord Camden CJ) 'Our law holds the property of every man so sacred that no
man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave. If he does, he is a trespasser,
though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour's ground, he must justify it
by law'.
78 Merest v Harvey (1814) 5 Taunt 442, 443, 128 Eng Rep 761, 761 (opinion of Gibbs CJ).
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law on 'the private repose and security of every man in his own house', as Lord
Chief Justice Ellenborough phrased it in 1811, 79 was in large measure an
expression of a legally recognized interest in privacy.
Visitors to England in the nineteenth century remarked at the overwhelming
preference for single family dwellings, high garden walls, and heavy locks 5 Even
so, every house needed windows for light and air, and inevitably houses might be
situated so that the activities of neighbours in front rooms and gardens were
visible from adjoining property without any actual trespass. Householders who
had long enjoyed freedom from curious eyes sought legal protection throughout
the nineteenth century when neighbours opened windows overlooking them. A
longstanding doctrine of 'ancient lights' had been applied to this situation. In a
cryptically reported case of 1709, Cherrington v Abney,"' the court announced
that windows could not be altered to the prejudice of a neighbouring owner, 'if
before ...

they could not look out of them into the yard, ...

for privacy is

valuable'., 2 Still earlier, an equally cryptic report had provided the
counterargument to be used by nineteenth century courts, 'Why may not I build
up a wall that another may not look into my yard ?' The uncertain state of the
law was discussed by LeBlanc J in Chandlerv Thompson, an 18 11 decision. 4 He
had known of actions for privacy,85 but had 'heard it laid down by Lord Chief
Justice Eyre that such an action did not lie'. 6
Litigants persisted with actions based on doctrines of ancient lights, nuisance,
and easements of privacy, but by the i86os the courts' attitude had hardened
against all such claims by neighbour against neighbour. Said Baron Bramwell in
the 1865 case of Jones v Tapling, 'it is to be remembered that privacy is not a
right. Intrusion on it is no wrong or cause of action.' 7 With this judicial remedy
thus foreclosed, householders enlisted the courts in effectuating private solutions:
Potts v Smith in 1868 allowed one neighbour to build a twenty-three foot wall
cutting off his neighbour's vantage, 8 and Manners v Johnson in 1875 enforced a
covenant 'that [an] act shall not be done the doing of which causes the invasion of
79 BurdettvAbbott(181 ) I4East i, 154-55, io4 Eng Rep 50I, 56o.
8o See e.g. 'The English, the Scots, and the Irish' Eur Rev (Oct 1824) 63; R. Emerson, 'Wealth' in
English Traits (London 1856) 92-93; R. Collier, English Home Life (1885) 13.
8, (1709) 2 Vern 646, 33 Eng Rep 1022.
82 2 Vern at 646, 33 Eng Rep at 1o22.
83 Knowles v Richardson (1670) 1 Mod Rep 55, 86 Eng Rep 727 (opinion of Twisden J).
84 (1811) 3 Camp 8o, 82, 170 Eng Rep 1312, 1313.

85 Cotterellv Griffiths (18oi) 4 Esp 69, 17o Eng Rep 644 was one such action.
86 3 Camp at 82, 17o Eng Rep at 1313.
87 (1862) 31 LJCP (NS) 342, 347, aff'd sub nom Tapling v Jones (1865) ii HLC 290, 305, 11 Eng

Rep 1344, 1350, 12 LT Rep 555 (opinion of Lord Westbury LC) invasion of privacy by opening
windows 'is not treated by the law as a wrong for which any remedy is given'. See also Turner v
Spooner (186) 30 LJ Ch (NS) 8oi, 803 (opinion of Kindersley V-C) '[N]o doubt the owner of a
house would prefer that a neighbour should not have the right of looking into his windows or
yard but neither this Court nor a Court of law will interfere on the mere ground of invasion of
privacy...'.
88 (1868)LR6Eq 3I1.
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privacy'.89 Yet, in the absence of such independently initiated protections, the
English householder at the close of the nineteenth century was at the mercy of
curious and resourceful neighbours. A leading casebook on tort mentions a
Balham dentist's unsuccessful complaint in 1904 against neighbours who arranged
large mirrors in their garden in order to observe all that went on in his study and
operating room.9° To twentieth century commentators, such an absurd situation
pointed out the existence of a gap in the legal protection of private property.91
Property owners had greater success in preventing observation of their houses
and grounds by curious strangers and the public generally. In 1867, for example, a
plaintiff invoked the law of nuisance to enjoin his neighbour from holding fetes
attracting large crowds of people, some of whom sat on the walls of the plaintiff's
grounds, 'destroy[ing his] privacy'. 92 The lessor of a house on the Thames was
granted compensation in 1872 for loss of privacy by reason of the construction of a
public road along the river bank. 9 The law of trespass was extended in the last
decade of the century to cover 'unreasonable' user of the highway adjoining the
plaintiff's land, 94 an activity that encompassed observation of the plaintiff's
activities on his own land. 95 The criminal law supplemented these remedies with
longstanding sanctions against peeping Toms and eavesdroppers96 as well as new
offences of 'watching and besetting' aimed primarily at trade union picketers. 97
B. Confidentialcommunications
A second set of legal doctrines gave more sketchy protection to the privacy of
letters, telegrams, and certain privileged conversations. One of these doctrines was
grounded in the right of an author to forbid publication of manuscript works on
grounds of 'literary property'. 98 When this legal protection was extended to the
writers of personal letters seeking to enjoin their publication by the recipients or
89 (1875) 1 Ch D 673, 681.
90 Editor's Note in C. Kenny, A Selection of Cases Illustrative of the English Law of Tort 4 th ed
(1926) 367.

91 See Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 520-21
(Evatt J dissenting); Winfield, supra n 18, 27.
92 Walker v Brewster (1867) LR 5 Eq 25, 26.
93 Buccleuch (Duke) v Metropolitan Board of Works (1872) LR 4 E & I App 408, 439 (recovery
under the Land Clauses Act 1845, s 63 and the Thames Embankment Act 1862, S 27). Cf Re
Penny (1857) 7 El & BI 66o, 669, 159 Eng Rep 1390, 1394 (no recovery under the Land Clauses
Act, supra, and the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, s 6 for loss in value of property
overlooked by railway platform).
94 Harrisonv Rutland(Duke)[18 9 3 ] 1 QB 142, 145-46, 152.
95 Hickman v Maisey [i9oo i QB 752, 755-56, 758.

96 See W. Blackstone, supran 66, vol 4, I68.
97 Y. Lyons & Sons v Wilkins [i899] i Ch 255, 267.
98 See e.g. 7efferys v Boosey (1854) 4 HLC 815, 978-79, Io Eng Rep 681, 745 (distinguishing
common law property in a manuscript and statutory copyright); Southey v Sherwood (1817) 2
Mer 435, 438, 35 Eng Rep ioo6, 1OO7; Queensberry(Duke) v Shebbeare (1758) 2 Eden 329, 330,
28 Eng Rep 924, 925 (injunction to restrain printing of unpublished manuscript).
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by third parties,99 the grounds of property protection soon became a convenient
fiction. In 1813, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor in Perceval v Phipps'"°
recognized that 'correspondence between friends, or relations, upon their private
concerns ... , could be made public in a way, that must frequently be very
injurious to the feelings of individuals', but expressed doubts that every private
letter merited protection as a literary work. Lord Eldon, in his judgment in the
x818 case of Gee v Pritchard,'1 1 laid such doubts to rest by stating frankly that he
did not forbid publication 'because the letters are written in confidence, or because
the publication of them may wound the feelings of the plaintiff', but that he could
do so on the ground of property in order to prevent such 'mischievous effects'.
The principle stated in a dissenting judgment in 1769 had become the rule, that
'every man has a right to keep his own sentiments' and 'a right to judge whether
he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends'. 0 2 In
the ultimate formulation of the doctrine, a writer of a letter retained a property
right in the words, while giving only a property right in the paper and ink to the
recipient.'0 3 By the beginning of the twentieth century the letter writer's property
right was so easily identified with a privacy interest that one High Court judge, in
upholding a 1905 judgment of £40o against the publisher of a personal letter,
admitted that 'in cases of this kind the property in a thing like a letter may be
10 4
mainly valuable because it gives the plaintiff the right to keep it private'.
Disclosure of private letters would only be allowed if it was necessary to vindicate
an important interest of the recipient. 10 5
'One instance', an eighteenth century tract pointed out, 'of the legislature's
regard to the privacy of papers and correspondence' was the enactment in 1710 of
a criminal penalty for unauthorized opening of letters in the Post Office.106 'The
nineteenth century courts stiffened the penalty by treating interception of letters
in the mails as larceny.' 07 Rumours of systematic letter opening by government

99 See Pope v Curl (x74I) 2 Atk 341, 342, 26 Eng Rep 6o8, 6o8 (opinion of Lord Hardwicke LC)
Letters give 'only a special property in the receiver,' not 'a license to any person whatsoever to
publish them to the world'; R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England (1792)
vol 3,415.
100 (1813) 2 Ves & Beam 19, 28, 35 Eng Rep 225, 229.

iox (1818) 2 Swan 402, 426, 36 Eng Rep 670, 678. See also Lytton (Earl)v Devey (1884) 54 LJ Ch
102
103
104
105

(NS) 293, 295-96.
Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303, 2379, 98 Eng Rep 201, 242 (Yates J dissenting).
See Oliverv Oliver(1861) i CB (NS) 139, 141, 142 Eng Rep 748, 748.
Thurston v Charles (1905) 21 TLR 659.
See Lytton (Earl)v Devey (1884) 54 LJ Ch (NS) 293, 295-96; Labouchere v Hess (1897) 77 LT

(NS) 559, 562-63.
io6 Father of Candor, An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, Concerning Libels,
Warrants and the Seizure of Papers (London 1764) 59. See Post Office Act 1710, s 40, later

re-enacted in Post Office Act 1837, s 25, and currently codified in Post Office Act 1969, 5 64.
107 See R v Jones (1846) 2 C & K 236, 245, 175 Eng Rep 98, 102 (interception of letter held
larceny); R vJ ames (1890 ) 24 QBD 436, 440 (inducing postman to intercept letter held theft).
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agents alarmed the English public in the mid-nineteenth century, 1°0 though the
subject did not come to the attention of the courts. An official inquiry revealed
that the practice existed, but the issue of six or seven warrants annually was
thought by the Select Committee of the Lords not to interfere with 'the sanctity of
private correspondence'.' °9 As a result of the public outcry, one of the secret
offices conducting such work was disbanded and 'in the other one, specific
warrants from the Secretary of State were henceforth required.11 o
Messages sent along telegraph wires, unlike letters in the mail, were necessarily
read by the sending and receiving operators."i Post Office regulations imposed
confidentiality requirements on telegraphers, 112 as did statutes forbidding
disclosure of the contents of any telegram." 3 Subpoenas in civil suits ordering
wholesale production of telegrams were refused in the 187os on the basis that 'the
necessary confidence of a sender of a telegram in the Post Office should not be
violated'." 4 Later in the century, this legal protection of telegraph messages from
unofficial interception was carried over to the newly invented telephone." 5 Official
interception remained possible, however, on analogy to warrants from the
Secretary of State to open letters.
Evidentiary privileges safeguarded the confidentiality of all communications, by
io8 See 75 Hansard (3rd

ser) 892-906, 1264-1305 (1844); 77 Hansard 668-97, 738-45 (1845);

'Opening Letters at the Post Office' 33 Law Magazine 248, 256 (1845); 'Post-Office Espionage'
2 NBrit Rev 257, 26o (1844) ('[T]he English feeling that this was a disgraceful business spread
all over the country'). For an earlier outcry, see 9 Parl Hist Eng 839, 842 (1735) 'Complaints
were made by several Members ... that the liberty given to break open letters at the post-office
could now serve no purpose, but to enable the little clerks about that office to pry into the
private affairs of every merchant, and of every gentleman in the kingdom'. For later objections,
see 267 Hansard(3rdser) 289-93; 258 Hansardio8o-8i (i88i).

lO9 See Report from the Secret Committee of the House of Lords Relative to the Post Office, (HL
Rep No 6oi), in 14 Parl Papers 1844 501, at [2]; 'Post-Office Espionage' supra n 1o8, 284:
'[W]herever a free Government exists, the sanctity of private correspondence going through the
Post-office is the subject of special enactments'. Predictably, Jeremy Bentham opposed the
notion of sanctity of correspondence. See J. Bentham, 'Anarchical Fallacies' in 2 Works, supra n
57, 489, 532.

Iio See E. Kenneth, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century (1958) 141.
iii The introduction of the post card posed a similar problem. See 'Post-Cards v. Envelopes' 47
Chambers's J 565, 566-67 (1870). One solution for securing both new forms of communication
was widespread resort to codes and ciphers, such as had been used in times of rampant letter
spying. See J. Wilkins, Mercury, or the Secret and Swift Messenger (London 1641) (early code
book); 'Post-Cards v. Envelopes' supra.
112 See R. Bond, Handbook of the Telegraph 3rd ed (1870) 7-8.
113 See Post Office Protection Act 1884, s i i; Telegraph Act 1868, S 20.
114 Borough of Stroud (1874) 2 O'M & H 107, 112 (opinion of Bramwell B on election petition)
'[P]ersons who correspond by telegram are obliged to repose confidence in the Crown, and I
believe it will be for the public good if it is found that that is a confidence that the Crown cannot
be compelled to violate'. This holding expanded the decision in Borough of Taunton (1874) 2
O'M & H 66, 73 (no compulsion to produce telegrams without strong specific grounds) and
contradicted Ince's Case (1869) 20 LT (NS) 421 (subpoenaed telegram not privileged).
115 See Attorney-General v Edison Telephone Co (i 88o) 6 QB 244.
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whatever means conducted, when they took place within certain specific
relationships."l 6 For example, it had long been 'undoubted law, that attornies
ought to keep inviolably the secrets of their clients'." 7 This privilege, extending to
any matter 'in its nature private' communicated to an attorney by his client,'' 8
was explained by Knight Bruce V-C as follows:" 9
[S]urely the meanness and mischief of prying into a man's confidential consultations with
his legal advisor, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and
suspicion, and fear into those communications which must take place, and which, unless in
a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too great a price to
pay for truth itself.

While the same legal protection did not extend to communications with doctors12 °
or clergymen, 121 courts did recognize the public's expectations of confidentiality
from these professionals,' 22 and judges expressed unwillingness to extract secrets
from them on the witness stand.' 23
One other relationship attained a protected status in nineteenth century
common law. For the first half of the century, husbands and wives were not
considered competent witnesses to testify for or against each other, even in civil
cases.' 24 When statutes removed the absolute barrier to spousal testimony, 2 '
there remained a privilege for communications made confidentially between

116 Letters, to be protected from compulsory disclosure in court, had to come under one of these
privileges. O'Shea v Wood[189I] P 286, 290.
117 Annesley v Anglesea (Earl)(1743) 17 Howell St Tr i 139, 1241. See also Berd v Lovelace (1 5 7 7 )
Cary 62, 21 Eng Rep 33.
118 Greenough v Gaskell(1833) I M & K 9 8, 104, 39 Eng Rep 618, 621.
119 Pearsev Pearse(1847) ii Jur 52, 55.
12o See e.g. Friend v London, Chatham, & Dover Ry Co (1877) LR 2 Ex D 437 (medical report
made solely for informing solicitor held privileged); Cossey v London, Brighton, & S Coast Ry
Co (187o) LR 5 CP 146 (same).
121 See e.g. Ruthven v De Bor (1901) 45 Sol J 272; Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LT (NS)
469, 470; R v Hay (186o) 2 F & F 4, 9 10, 175 Eng Rep 933, 936; Gilham's Case (1828) 1
Moody's CC 186, 198.
122 See Wheeler v Le Marchant (188i) 17 Ch D 675, 681; Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav 137, 145,
48 Eng Rep 891, 894; R v Kingston (Duchess) (776) 2o Howell St Tr 355, 573. Bentham
advocated capitalizing on the public perception of confidentiality in communications to
clergymen. See Letter from Jeremy Bentham to Charles Abbott, Nov 18oo, in io Works, supra
n 57, 351, 354 (curates should be required to collect census data).
123 See Kitson v Playfair,The Times 28 March 1896, at 5, col i; R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox CC 219;
Broadv Pitt (i828) 3 Car & P 518, 519, 172 Eng Rep 528, 529, M & M 233, 234, 173 Eng Rep
1142, 1143.
124 See e.g. Stapleton v Crofts (1852) 18 QB 367, 368, 118 Eng Rep 137, 138; O'Connor v
Maroribanks (1842) 4 Man & G 435, 445-46, 134 Eng Rep 179, 183; Monroe v Twistleton
(1802) Peake Add Cas 219, 221, 17o Eng Rep 250, 251 (privilege survived divorce).
125 See Evidence Amendment Act 1853 (husbands and wives competent to testify in civil cases);
Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (husbands and wives competent to testify for defence in criminal
cases).
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126

husband and wife.
This 'social policy' to hold marital confidences 'sacred""
was explained in an 1824 decision: 'the happiness of the marriage state requires
that the confidence between man and wife should be kept for ever inviolable'.12 8
Jeremy Bentham, who fulminated against all evidentiary barriers to truthfinding,
reserved especial scorn for this protection, 129 but it was entrenched in the law. In
other contexts as well, nineteenth century courts sought to minimize their
interference with 'the private affairs of the people' and their 'domestic life'.1 30 The
doctrines of literary property in personal letters, sanctity of the mails, and
evidentiary privilege, though variously grounded, combined to accord a limited
protection for the communications deemed most deserving of confidentiality in the
nineteenth century.
C. Personalinformation
Nineteenth century English courts afforded only a precarious protection to
intangible personal information but showed some of their greatest legal
inventiveness when they did act to protect this privacy interest. As James
Fitzjames Stephen wrote in 1873: 'Privacy may be violated not only by the
intrusion of a stranger, but by compelling or persuading a person to direct too
much attention to his own feelings' and to 'strip his soul stark naked for the
inspection of any other."'" Personal secrets of past wrongdoing had long been
protected from forced disclosure in court by the maxim nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum.132 This privilege against self-incrimination, assured by statute since the
seventeenth century, 13 ' also extended to revelations that would lead to civil
126

127
128

129

130
131
132

See e.g. Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s i(d). See also Cowley v Cowley, The Times 20 January
1897, at 13, col 3 (in divorce proceedings, husband could refuse to produce letter written to him
by wife). Judicial attitudes preceded the legislative change. See Stapleton v Crafts (1852) 18 QB
367, 368, 118 Eng Rep 137, 138.
Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 2o QBD 635, 639 (opinion of Manisty J) (disclosure of libel to wife
held not evidence of publication).
Doker v Hasler(1824) Ry &M 198, 198, 17I Eng Rep 992, 992 (opinion of Best CJ).
See J. Bentham, Works, supra n 57, vol 7, 486 (while the law 'make[s] every man's house his
castle', the privilege 'convert[s] that castle into a den of thieves').
In reAgar-Ellis(1883) 24 Ch D 317, 335 (opinion of Bowen LJ) (custody proceeding).
J. Stephen, supra n 58, i6o, 162.
See R v Friend (1696) 13 Howell St Tr 1, 17; W. Blackstone, supra n 66, vol 4, 296. See
generally L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968); Wigmore, 'Nemo Tenetur Seipsum
Prodere' 5 Harv L Rev 71 (I89I). Official seizure of private papers was also condemned by
English judicial authority, partly on this ground and partly as trespass to goods, since 'where

private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an
aggravation of the trespass and demand more considerable damages in that respect' Entick v

Carrington(1765) 59 Howell St Tr 1029, io66, 1073, 2 Wils KB 275, 291, 95 Eng Rep 807,
817-18 (opinion of Lord Camden CJ). See 'Opening Letters at the Post Office' 33 Law
Magazine 248, 255 (1845).
133 See Abolition of the Court of High Commission 1641, 6 Car I, c I1, s 4, reconfirmed in
Ecclesiastical Commission Act 1661, 8 4, Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1851, s 3. But see
Langbein, 'The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers' 45 U Chi L Rev 263, 283 (1978) (finding
little respect for this principle in eighteenth century practice).
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forfeiture.' 34 Judicial interpretations varied on the degree of likelihood of
prosecution 35 and the subjective or objective determination of its gravity, 136 but
the privilege remained secure. A related doctrine threw cases out of court when
they needlessly introduced 'indecent' evidence tending to injure a person's
feelings.'
With the onrushing complexity of nineteenth century industrial and commercial
life, however, individuals gave up more and more sensitive personal information
about themselves to governmental and private institutions. 3 The census, for
example, widened its inquiry (and thus had to overcome fresh public opposition)
with each passing decade. 39 Since customary local remedies against 'gossiping'
had long since vanished, 4 ° the legal ramifications of this loss of individual control
had to be worked out anew by the courts. An Englishman's banker, it was held,
might be forced to disclose his exact financial status in court upon a proper and

134 See e.g. Mexborough (Earl)v Whitford Urban Dist Council[1897] 2 QB Ili; Pye v Butterfield
(1864) 5 B & S 829, 122 Eng Rep 1038.
135 Compare Adams v Lloyd (i858) 3 H & N 351, 363, 157 Eng Rep 5o6, 510 (opinion of Pollock
CB) '[T]he answer of the witness must have a direct tendency to place him in danger' with
Harrisonv Southeote (75 i Atk 528, 539, 26 Eng Rep 333, 340 (opinion of Lord Hardwicke
LC) '[A] man shall not be obliged to discover what may subject him to a penalty, not what must
only' (emphasis in original).
136 Compare Adams v Lloyd (1858) 3 H & N 351, 362, 157 Eng Rep 5o6, 5IO (judge may determine
that a witness is trifling with the court and compel an answer) and Ex parteReynolds (1882) 20
Ch D 294, 297 (same) with Lamb v Munster (1882) io QBD 110, 13 (witness may swear that

the answer would endanger him) and Cates v Hardacre(i81i) 3 Taunt 424, 425, 128 Eng Rep
168, 168 (enough that witness 'thought' an answer would incriminate him, links in chain need
not be apparent to the judge).
137 See Da Costa v Jones (778) 2 Cowp 729, 736, 98 Eng Rep 1331, 1335 (refusing to hear an
action brought on a wager as to the sex of a third party); Ditchburnv Goldsmith (i815) 4 Camp
152, 153, 171 Eng Rep 49, 49 (refusing to hear an action brought on a wager as to the sex of a
child about to be born to an unmarried woman).
138 For a proposal to record names, ages, addresses and occupations, under oath, in the Census of
18oi, despite 'those suspicions which ignorance is so apt to harbour', see Letter from Jeremy
Bentham to Charles Abbott, Nov i8oo, in to Works, supra n 57, 351, 351-52, 355-56. For
proposals to compile registers of identifying characteristics, see A. Bertillon, Signaletic
Instructions (1896) vii-ix (anthropometrical identification); Galton, 'Identification by
Fingertips' 30 Nineteenth Century 303, 305 (1891) (fingerprints used by British magistrate in

Bengal to identify natives).
139 See e.g. 'The Census' 23 CornhillMagazine 415, 424 (1871), 'Census Curiosities' 5 All the Year
Round 15, 15-i6 (i86i), 'Curiosities of the Census' 22 NBrit Rev 401, 402-03 (1855). Earlier

opposition is recorded in 'Census of England and Wales and of the United Kingdom, i88i' 44J
StatisticalSoc'y 398, 399-400 (i88i).
140 See Confession of Elizabeth Bowltell, 26 May 1595, quoted in Hall, 'Some Elizabethan Penances
in the Diocese of Ely' i Trans Royal Hist Soc'y (3rd ser) 263, 272 (907) (ecclesiastical offence

of gossiping).
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necessary inquiry,141 but the bank142 and its employees 143 had a duty not to
disclose such information to third parties. 141
Englishmen seeking damages for an offensive disclosure of personal details in
print' 45 would look first to their remedies in defamation. The difficulty with civil
actions for libel and slander, however, was that the truth of the matter published
had become a complete defence.1 46 When the gravamen of the injury was an
147
invasion of privacy, the truth of the matter disclosed was precisely its sting.
The little-used criminal libel prosecution, by contrast, had as its watchword, 'the
greater the truth, the greater the libel'. 4 Courts and juries sympathetic to privacy
interests in civil libel actions could nevertheless look for inaccuracies of detail in
an otherwise truthful account of the private character of a private individual 4 9
and could interpret disclosures of personal information as 'comment' that was not
'privileged'. 5 °
When an invasion of privacy could be prevented or contained, the equitable
injunction offered a means of judicial protection much more satisfying than that of
libel damages after the fact. Plaintiffs seeking such relief for the disclosure of
personal information had to surmount Chancery's unwillingness to issue
injunctions except in protection of property. 5 ' The first assault on this
141 See Loyd v Freshfield(1826) 2 Car & P 325, 329, 172 Eng Rep 147, 148.
142 See Fosterv Bank of London (1862) 3 F & F 214, 217, 176 Eng Rep 96, 98 (jury finding).
143 See Tipping v Clarke (1843) 2 Hare 383, 393, 67 Eng Rep 157, 161 (clerk's implied contract not
to reveal what he learns in the course of duty).
144 But see Hardy v Vesey (i868) LR 3 Ex 107, 111-13 (violation of duty justified when motive is
to assist customer).
145 The appetite of the newspaper-buying public for scandalous personal information can be taken
as constant over the period. See Perkins, 'The Origins of the Popular Press' 7 Hist Today 425,
434 (1957).
146 See e.g. McPherson v Daniels (1829) io B & C 263, 272, iO9 Eng Rep 448, 451 (opinion of

Littledale J) '[Tjhe law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect of an injury to a
character which he either does not, or ought not, to possess'.
147 See J. Bentham, 'Rationale of Judicial Evidence' in 6 Works, supran 57, 189, 269-70.
148 See e.g.J. Fisher and J. Strahan, The Law of the Press (i89i) 175-76; "'The Greater the Truth,
the Greater the Libel"' 26 Can L Times 394, 394-95 (19o6). The common law rule was
modified by Lord Campbell's Act 1843, s 6 (publication of a defamatory truth not criminal if
jury determines publication was for public benefit).
149 See Wilson v Reed (1860) 2 F & F 149, 152, 175 Eng Rep IooO, 1002, Bembridge v Latimer

(1864) io LT (NS) 816; J. Fisher and J. Strahan, supra n 148, 133 (strictness of proof). An
example is Leyman v Latimer (1878) 47 LJ Ex (NS) 470, 472 (opinion of Brett LJ), holding the
appellation 'felon' to be untrue of one whose sentence has been served and finding it 'wicked and
malignant' to thus 'rake up the past misdoings of others'.
i5o See e.g. Pankhurst v Hamilton (1887) 3 TLR 500, 505 (Grove J instructing the jury) 'Matters
discussed between gentlemen at clubs, dinner parties, or in the lobby of the House of Commons
ought not to be seriously repeated'.
151 See e.g. Clark v Freeman(1848) ii Beav 112, 117-18, 50 Eng Rep 759, 761 (no injunction to
prevent publication of a libel unless property injured); Gee v Prichard(1818) 2 Swanst 402, 426,
36 Eng Rep 670, 678 (property basis of injunction to restrain publication of letters). But see
Morison v Moat (1852) 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng Rep 492 (injunction granted for breach of faith and
of contract), aff'd (1852) 21 LJ Ch (NS) 248.
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jurisdictional barrier to effective privacy relief expanded the concept of property to
include privacy interests. Judicial solicitude for the sensibilities of the Queen and
her Prince Consort provided the occasion when a Mr Strange offered the public a
catalogue describing the amateur artistic efforts of the royal couple. In Albert v
Strange,'5 2 the Solicitor-General asked the court to find that the defendant had
abstracted 'one attribute of property, which was often its most valuable quality,
namely, privacy',153 and Knight Bruce V-C issued the injunction against what he
called 'sordid spying into the privacy of domestic life'." 4 On appeal, Lord
Cottenham LC also said that privacy was the right invaded, though property was
the basis of relief.' 55 Chancery's rule limiting injunctions to protection of property
led a later Vice-Chancellor to find property in land, goods, business, skill, and
'even in a man's good name'.) 6
Towards the end of the century, Chancery's rule was circumvented in other
ways to affirm privacy interests. In Pollardv Photographic Co, an 1888 case, a
woman whose photographic portrait was exhibited for sale by the photographer
obtained an injunction on two grounds: breach of an implied term in the
photographer's contract and abuse of the confidence placed in him by his
customer.' 5 7 In the 1894 case of Monson v Tussauds Ltd, a man acquitted of
murder succeeded in having an effigy of himself removed from a London waxwork
exhibition on the basis of defamation.'5 8 Two of the judges in the latter case
delivered denunciations of the practices of exhibitors and newspaper journalists in
portraying truthful incidents of private life." 9 Unless some prior relationship of
152 (1848) 2 De G & Sm 652, 64 Eng Rep 293, aff'd (1849) 1 Mac & G 25, 41 Eng Rep 1171. For
another expression of deference to royal sensibilities see Wyatt v Wilson (1820) I Mac & G 46,
41 Eng Rep 1179 (opinion of Lord Eldon LC) 'If one of the late King's physicians had kept a
diary of what he heard and saw, this Court would not, in the King's lifetime, have permitted
him to print and publish it'.
153 2 De G & Sm at 670, 64 Eng Rep at 301.
154 2 De G & Sm at 698, 64 Eng Rep at 313.
155 1 Mac & G at 4 7, 41 Eng Rep at 1179.
156 Dixon v Holden (1869) LR 7 Eq 488, 492 (opinion of Sir Richard Malins V-C).
157 See Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345, 349, 352 (married woman's photograph
sold as Christmas card). See also Stedall v Houghton (19o) 18 TLR 126 (on the same double
grounds, husband restrained the exhibition of photographs of his estranged wife and children).
It was much doubted whether the courts could have reached this result under the Copyright
(Works of Art) Act 1862, s i. See Williams, 'The Sale of Photographic Portraits' 24 SolJ 4 , 4-5
(1879).
158 See Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671. The opportunity for a ruling on the law of
privacy in this case drew widespread attention. See Speed, 'The Right of Privacy' 163 N Am
Rev 64, 70-71 (1896); Note 7 Harv L Rev 492 (1894).
159 See [1894] 1 QB 678 (opinion of Matthew J). For a newspaper 'to shadow a man who had been
acquitted of a crime, to take portraits of him and to publish them ... would be a sharp
instrument of torture, and an outrage on the man's comfort and peace'; ibid. 687 (opinion of
Lord Halsbury) 'Is it possible to say that everything which has once been known may be
reproduced with impunity in print or picture; ... every incident which has ever happened in
private life, furnish material for the adventurous exhibitor... ?'.
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the parties or defamatory innuendo could be shown, however, publication of a
person's likeness or description would not give rise to an injunction at the end of
the nineteenth century. 6' The legal regime in place by x9oo-interstitial and
incomplete protection of acknowledged privacy interests through a variety of
other legal doctrines-was to remain largely unchanged in England until the
second half of the twentieth century.' 6
IV.

OTHER ROUTES TO RECOGNITION

A. Statutoryproposals
In 196i, thirty years after Percy Winfield had urged the courts to recognize a right
to privacy, 162 Gerald Dworkin remarked in the pages of the Modern Law Review
that in default of judicial creativity, legislation was the only avenue open.' 63 Thus
began nearly two decades of Parliamentary temporizing and judicial buck16o See e.g. Dockrell v Dougall(1899) 8o LT 556, 15 TLR 333 (use of name); Corelliv Wall (1906)
22 TLR 532 (postcards depicting novelist).
x61 See generally infra 353-362. For example, courts continued to reject claims based on
publication of photographs in Sports & GeneralPressAgency Ltd v 'Our Dogs' Publishing Co
Ltd [1916] z KB 88o, 889 (dictum of Horridge J) (no right to prevent publication of a
photograph or description 'not libelous or otherwise wrongful'), aff'd [1917] 2 KB 125; Wood v
Sandow, The Times 30 June 1914, at 4, col i (plaintiff's photograph appeared in corset
advertisement, no libel or copyright infringement). But juries could take a different view. See
Plumb v Jeyes' Sanitary Compounds Co Ltd, The Times 15 April 1937, at 4, col 4 (plaintiff's
photograph appeared in footbath advertisement, jury awarded £roo libel damages); Funston v
Pearson, The Times 12 March 1915, at 3, col 3 (plaintiff's photographs with and without false
teeth appeared in dentist's advertisement, jury awarded £30 libel damages).
162 See Winfield, supra n z8.
163 See Dworkin, supra n 25, 188-89. The House of Commons may have considered taking
measures against press activities following the press's hounding of Colonel Lindbergh and his
wife during their stay in England. See Adam, 'Freemen of the Press?' 144 Fortnightly(NS) 34
(1938); Ervine, 'Privacy and the Lindberghs' 139 Fortnightly(NS) 18o (1936). See also Political
and Economic Planning, Report on the British Press (1938) (call for legislation). Privacy
concerns also played a part in Lord Reading's Preservation of the Rights of the Subject Bill
1947 introduced at 147 HansardHL ( 5 th ser) 762, 767 (clause 6 on powers of search), and Lord
Samuel's Liberties of the Subject Bill 195o introduced at 167 HansardHL ( 5 th ser) 1041,
1051-52 (1950) (clause 6 on same). Several committees had considered and rejected the
possibility of privacy legislation. See Report of the Departmental Committee on Powers of
Subpoena of Disciplinary Tribunals (HMSO i960) Cmnd 1033, para 30 (Viscount Simonds,
Chairman) allowing evidence from telephone wire-tapping; Report of the Committee of Privy
CouncillorsAppointed to Inquire into the Interception of Communications (HMSO 1957) Cmnd
283 (Lord Birkett, Chairman) approving government wire-tapping procedures despite lack of
express statutory authorization (hereinafter cited as 'Birkett Committee'); Royal Commission
on the Press, 1947-1949, Report (HMSO 1949) Cmd 7700, paras 489-91, 642-43 (Sir William

Ross, Chairman) ('extremely difficult to devise legislation' on intrusion by reporters); Report of
the Committee on the Law of Defamation (HMSO 1948) Cmd 7536, paras 24-26 (Lord Porter,
Chairman) (invasion of privacy merely an 'offence against good taste'); Lloyd, 'Reform of the
Law of Libel' 5 CurrentLegal Problems 168, 176-77 (1952).
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passing. 164 The first comprehensive legislative proposal on the subject, Lord
Mancroft's Right of Privacy Bill, was introduced in the House of Lords in March
of that year. 65 It provided a remedy against publication without consent of a
plaintiff's personal affairs or conduct unless the defendant established one of a
1 66
number of defences, including 'reasonable public interest' in the publication.
Though the newspapers bitterly fought the measure, focusing their attack on its
'reasonable public interest' standard, 167 Lord Goddard (a former Chief Justice)
and Lord Denning supported the Bill, 168 and a strong majority of the Lords sent it
on to a Second Reading. 169 The Lord Chancellor, however, thought the subject
unsuitable for legislation, 110 and without the Government's support it died in
Committee. 7' It is worth remarking that in the debate on Lord Mancroft's Bill,
both Lord Denning and Lord Kilmuir LC expressed their confidence that judicial
recognition of an action for infringement of privacy was not far off.'72
The next flurry of legislative interest arose in 1967, sparked by Alexander
Lyon's Right of Privacy Bill establishing an action against unreasonable and
serious interference with the seclusion of an individual, his family, or his property,
subject again to several defences.' 73 This proposal also drew heavy opposition
from the press 17 4 and foundered for want of Government support.175 Later that
164 See e.g. Director of Public Prosecutions v Withers [1975] AC 842, 863, 872 (opinion of Lord
Simon) (to find a 'conspiracy to invade privacy' illegal would interfere with Parliament's
consideration of the issue); Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No2) [1979] Ch
344, 380-8i (opinion of Megarry V-C) (even on a subject [government wire-tapping] which
'cries out for legislation', the court should avoid a result that would induce Parliament to
legislate).
165 See 228 HansardHL(5th ser) 716 (1q61); The Times 16 February 1961, at 17, col 4.
x66 See Right of Privacy Bill 1961 reprinted in Younger Committee, supra n 1, Appendix I at
273-74.
167 See e.g. Editorial, 'What is Reasonable?' The Times 13 March 1961, at 15, col 4. See also 229

HansardHL(5th ser) 618-i9 (1961).
168 See 229 HansardHL ( 5 th ser) 621-24 (1961) (remarks of Lord Goddard) 'It has always seemed

to me a blot on our jurisprudence that there is no remedy for a person whose privacy is invaded.
. .. '; ibid., 637-40 (1961) (remarks of Lord Denning) '[I]f the law does not give the right of
privacy, the sooner this Bill gives it the better'.
169 The vote was 74 to 21. Ibid., 66o (1961).
170 See ibid., 625-30; 232 HansardHL(5th ser) 293-96 (196i).
171 See 232 HansardHL(5 th ser) 289-90 (1961).
172 See 229 HansardHL (5th ser) 639-40 (1961) (remarks of Lord Denning) 'But would not our

own courts give a remedy in infringement of privacy? ... [Tihey ought to'; 232 HansardHL
(5th ser) 295 (1961) (remarks of Lord Kilmuir LC) '[W]hether there is already a right of privacy
in Common Law' is a matter which 'j]udges... might have at any time to decide'.
173 See 740 HansardHC (5th ser) 1565 (1967); Right of Privacy Bill 1967 reprinted in Younger
Committee, supra n i, Appendix I at 275.
174 See Editorial, 'The Private Citizen', The Times 16 June 1967, at Ii, col 1. See generally Baxter,
supra n 39, 7; Vetch, 'Interests in Personality' 23 NIrLQ 423, 448 (1972).
175 See 794 HansardHC (5th ser) 881 (1970). See generally D. Madgwick, Privacy Under Attack

(1968) 7; Dworkin, 'The Younger Committee Report on Privacy' 36 Mod L Rev 399, 402
(1973).
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year, the Law Commission held a high-level seminar on privacy legislation, but
withdrew from the field in expectation of a parliamentary committee.176 Also in
177
1967, following a conference of the International Commission of Jurists,
'Justice', the British section of that body, embarked on a long-term study of the
privacy issue. 7 ' Succeeding years saw a number of bills introduced to deal with
one or another aspect of privacy invasion,179 all of them unsuccessful. Justice
emerged with a draft bill in 1969,180 and with slight changes this was put forward
by Brian Walden as a Right of Privacy Bill in I969.'s'
The Walden Bill defined an inclusive 'right to privacy' and a 'right of action for
infringement of privacy' subject as always to certain definite defences.' 82 It
attracted such wide support that, despite predictable press hostility,8 3 the Home
Secretary only averted a Second Reading by promising to set up a Government
Committee to consider legislation.18 4 This Committee, chaired by Sir Kenneth
Younger and charged to consider only non-governmental incursions on privacy,'
laboured for two years and made its Report in 1972. The Committee members,
with two dissents, came out against a general right to privacy.18 6 The scheme of
parliamentary enactment of comprehensive privacy legislation proposed by
Dworkin in i96I was discredited. 7 Even the Younger Committee's minor
recommendations for new criminal offences have not been enacted. The
Committee's suggestions for voluntary self-regulation, including an increased lay

176 See Law Commission, Third Annual Report: 1967-68, para 70 (Law Comm No 15, 1968). See

177
178
179

18o
18
i82
183

184
i85
186
187

also Law Commission, Fourth Annual Report: i968-69, para 76 (Law Comm No 27, 1969)
('[Elarly comprehensive examination of this subject by a widely based commission or committee
is essential').
See International Commission of Jurists, Conclusions of the Nordic Conference on Privacy
(1967).
See Justice, Privacyand the Law (1970) 2.
See e.g. Bill of Rights (No 2) Bill 1969 introduced at 787 HansardHC ( 5 th ser) 1519, 1520
(1969) (Clause so provided: 'Every person is entitled to protection from arbitrary interference in
his personal, family or other private affairs'). See also Unauthorised Telephone Monitoring Bill
1967, Industrial Information (Protection) Bill 1968, Private Investigations Bill 1969, Data
Surveillance Bill 1969, Personal Records (Computers) Bill 1969, Control of Personal
Information Bill 1971, Security Industry Licensing Bill 1973, Private Detectives Control Bill
1974.
See Justice, supran 178, 59-62.
See 792 HansardHC (5 th ser) 430 (1969).
See Right of Privacy Bill 1969, reprinted in Younger Committee, supra n i, Appendix I at
276-78.
See e.g. Baistow, 'Privacy versus Freedom' 79 New Statesman 1o8 (1970).
See 79 4 HansardHC(5 th ser) 9 4 1 (1970).
See Younger Committee, supra n 1, paras 1, 3-5.
See ibid., paras 661-67 (majority recommendation); ibid., 2o8- 5 (minority reports).
See e.g. 343 Hansard HL ( 5 th ser) 104-78 (i973) (inconclusive debate on the Younger
Committee Report).
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presence on the Press Council"' and complaint procedures in the broadcasting
authorities, 8 9 have had more effect, but comprehensive privacy legislation has not
appeared likely since the 1972 report. 90
Issues of governmental intrusion on personal privacy, a matter beyond the
scope of the Younger Committee's report, have since been drawn to Parliament's
attention. When the question of official wire-tapping was raised in 1979,191 a
White Paper was prepared on the subject 192 but the Government remained
opposed to any legislation altering current practices.' 93 Interest in proposed
'freedom of information' legislation has sparked consideration of what privacy
exceptions such enactments would require, 94 again with no tangible result as yet.
Parliament has shown more willingness to consider codes of protection for
personal information in public and private data banks, no doubt in response to
pressure from other European nations.195 Two reports in 1975196 and one in

i88 See 'Press Council Is Doubling Its Lay Membership' The Times 29 November 1972, at 6, col 4.
The Press Council, established voluntarily in 1953 to avert statutory imposition, remains firmly
opposed to privacy legislation. See Press Council, Policy Statement on Privacy, quoted in The
Times 12 April 1976, at 4, col I: '[A]ny attempt to legislate on privacy would be contrary to the
public interest'. See generally H. Levy, The Press Council (1967) 240-69; G. Murray, The Press
and the Public(1972) 91-92.
189 In 1971 the Independent Television Authority set up its Complaints Review Board, see The
Times 4 October 1971, at i, col 4; and in 1972 the British Broadcasting Corporation established
a Programmes Complaints Commission, see 'Adjudications' 88 Listener 83, 83-84 (1972).
19o The Younger Committee Report expressed hope that the developing law of breach of confidence
could encompass an adequate substitute for a privacy remedy, but a Law Commission study has
found this approach inadequate in several respects. See Law Commission, Breach of Confidence
(Working Paper No 58, 1974). See also Royal Commission on the Press, FinalReport (HMSO
1977) Cmnd 68io, paras 19.9-19.18 (Prof McGregor, Chairman) reluctantly recommending
against a statutory right to privacy; Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court (HMSO
1974) Cmnd 5794, para 216 (Phillimore LJ Chairman) recommending minimum interference
with the press; Report of the Committee on Defamation (HMSO 1975) Cmnd 5909, paras
137-40 (Faulks J, Chairman) rejecting a public benefit component in the defence of justification.
Recently, the Law Commission has recommended a statutory remedy, this one denominated
breach of confidence, applicable to strangers acquiring personal information and marital
confidences by such means as electronic bugging and surreptitious surveillance. See Law
Commission, Breach of Confidence (Law Comm No iTo, 198I); Jones, 'The Law Commission's
Report on Breach of Confidence' [ 1982] Camb L 40.
191 See 963 HansardHC(sth ser) 750-51 (97).
192 See The Interception of Communications in Great Britain (HMSO 198o) Cmnd 7873
(disclosing the issuance of nearly i,ooo warrants for interception annually).
193 See 982 HansardHC(5 th ser) 205-20 (198o).
194 See T. Barnes, Open Up! 8- 9 (Fabian Tract 467, 198o); Justice, Freedom ofInformation (1978)
8, 10,7-18.
195 See infra 350-353.
196 See Computers and Privacy (HMSO 1975) Cmnd 6353 (promising future legislation);
Computers: Safeguardsfor Privacy (HMSO 1975) Cmnd 6354 (reviewing Britain's computer
systems and legislation abroad).
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I978'1 have addressed the problem, recommending establishment of a permanent
Data Protection Authority. At the end of 1982, the Thatcher Government
introduced a Data Protection Bill of limited scope; it would require registration of
most computerized record systems compiling personal information on individuals
(but not manual record systems) and would establish procedures for subjects to
obtain access to their records.' 9"
Although the drive for explicit and comprehensive privacy legislation has failed,
Parliament did enact, in a piecemeal and incidental fashion, a number of privacy
protections of limited scope. Unofficial mail-opening and disclosure of the
contents of telegrams have long been offences,' 99 and it is possible to piece
together statutory prohibitions against most methods of wire-tapping and
bugging.200 Many statutes, including the Official Secrets Act, make disclosure by
civil servants of information obtained in confidence in the course of duty an
offence. 2 ' Beginning in the 192OS, statutes have begun to close off court
proceedings in divorce, wardship and other highly sensitive matters from press
reporting. 20 2 Also by statute, fingerprints of arrested minors under the age of
fourteen are not recorded, and fingerprint records of acquitted adult defendants
are destroyed. 20 3 The Copyright Act has added a remedy for false attribution of
authorship, 2 4 and television broadcasting authorities have been required to delete
programmes offensively representing any living person. 205 More recently,
20 6
of
Parliament has prohibited intrusive 'harassment' of tenants by landlords,
20 7
and of any person by means of obscene and menacing
debtors by creditors,
telephone calls 208 and unsolicited obscene publications. 209 In the mid-1970s major
197 See Report of the Committee on Data Protection (HMSO 1978) Cmnd 7341 (Sir Norman
Lindop, Chairman) recommending a Data Protection Act establishing a Data Protection
Authority (hereinafter cited as 'Lindop Committee').
198 See Shaw, 'Data Bank Reforms Aim to Extend Individual Rights' The Times 23 December
1982, at IX,col i.
199 See Post Office Act 1969, s 64; Post Office Act 1953, ss 52, 56, 58(I); Telegraph Act 1868, s 2o;
Post Office Protection Act 1884, s I I.
200 See Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, ss i(), 5(8); Theft Act 1968 (stealing electricity).
2ol See e.g. Finance Act 1978, s 77; Population (Statistics) Act 1938, S 4; Census Act 1920, s 8(2);
Official Secrets Act 1911, S 2.
202 See Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 6(1).
On the latter provision see R v Stafford [1972] x WLR 1649, 1651 (opinion of Lord Widgery
CJ) 'the right of an accused person to, as it is said, opt for privacy in committal proceedings';
Attorney-General v English [1982] 2 WLR 959' 970 (judgment of Watkins LJ).
203 See Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, s 40.
204 Copyright Act 1956, s 43; infra n 328.
2o 5 See Television Act 1954, s 3().
206 See Rent Act 1965, s 30. See Yennison v Baker [1972] 2 QB 52, 6o (landlord jailed for
contempt). 'The tenants' rooms were entered with a pass-key and furniture left disturbed and
windows opened so that tenants should know that their privacy had been invaded'.
207 See Administration of Justice Act 1970, 8 40.
208 See Post Office Act 1953, s 66.
209 See Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971, s 4.
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statutory protections have been the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 providing
individuals with access and opportunities to correct credit information compiled
on them,21° the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, imposing criminal and civil
penalties on disclosure of spent convictions, 21' and the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act of 1976, securing the anonymity of rape victims and
however, and the
defendants.212 The parliamentary contribution remains small,
2 13
legislative momentum appears to have been lost to the courts.
B. Internationalprotection of human rights
British jurists, notably Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,1 4 played an important role in the
drafting and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1948.215 Among the broad and ambiguous
statements of principle in the Declaration, Article 12 provides: 'No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. ... Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference .*..,.z6 Despite the Declaration's unanimous adoption, and
despite subsequent resolutions calling upon States to 'fully and faithfully observe'
its provisions,217 its status as a norm of international law has long been
doubted.218 Some enforcement apparatus was created by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature in 1966 and brought
into force ten years later.219 Article 17 of the Covenant repeats the Universal
Declaration provision on privacy, adding the qualification that interference is only
a violation if 'unlawful' as well as arbitrary. 220 Parties to the International
Covenant, of which the United Kingdom is one, oblige themselves 'to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' all of
the rights enumerated and 'to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect' to them. 221 The British Government has denied, however,
that any such legislation on its part is necessary, pointing to 'safeguards of
different kinds, operating in the various legal systems, independently of the
Covenant but in full conformity to it'. 222 Human rights agreements of world-wide
210 Consumer Credit Act 1974, ss i58-6o.
211 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.

212 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s 6.
213 See infra 353-362.
214 See H. Lauterpacht, An InternationalBill of the Rights of Man (i945).

2X5 Universal Declaration, supran 6.
26 Ibid.
217 See e.g. GA Res 1904, i8 GAOR, Supp 15, UN Doe A/5 5 15 at 35 (1963).
2x8 See e.g. Henkin, 'Introduction' in L. Henkin ed, The InternationalBillof Rights (198i) 1, 9.
219 International Covenant, supra n 7.
22o Ibid.

221 Ibid., Art 2(1) and (2). But see UN Doc E/CN.4 /SR. 4 27 at io (1954) (UK representative
denying that treaties could impose requirement of domestic legislation).
222 UN Doc CCPR/C/i Add 17 at 1 (i977). See also Central Office of Information, Human Rights
in the United Kingdom (R 3980, 1958).
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scope have not provided any impetus for the recognition of a right to privacy in
English law.223
By contrast, the European Convention on Human Rights of 195o has shown
much greater promise.224 Article 8(1) of the Convention states a general and
unqualified right to privacy: 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence'.22 The Article goes on to provide
that '[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right' and adds several qualifications:226
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The United Kingdom, as a signatory, is obliged to 'secure to everyone within [its]
jurisdiction' all the rights defined by the Convention,227 but makes no more
specific undertaking to enact such rights or to give the Convention the force of
law.22 In a report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, the British
Government dealt with Article 8 by stating: 'Any power a public authority may
have to interfere with a person's right to respect for private and family life, his
home and his correspondence must be provided by law'.229 Current interpretation
of Article 8 to provide a right against non-governmental as well as governmental
interferences23 ° renders such an answer inadequate and promises at least
continued consideration of legal protection of privacy by the English domestic
courts.
It is standard constitutional doctrine in England that international treaties do
not have the effect of domestic law, 231 and the European Convention is no
See e.g. 229 Hansard HL (5 th ser) 628-29 (1961) (remarks of Lord Kilmuir LC) (The 1948
Universal Declaration 'aim[s] mainly at physical interference, such as the activities of secret
police'); International Commission of Jurists, 'The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative
Survey of Ten Countries' 24 Int'l Soc SciJ 417, 458 (1972) (The Universal Declaration 'has no
legal effect in English law').
224 European Convention, supra n 8.
225 Ibid., Art 8(1).
223

226

Ibid., Art 8(2).

227

See ibid., Art i.

228 See e.g. Jaconelli, 'The European Convention on Human Rights-The Text of a British Bill of

Rights?' 1976 Pub L 226, 233-34.
Doc H (67) 2, published Io January 1967. This appears to be untrue of telephone tapping.
Compare Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] Ch 344 (sustaining
government wire-tapping practices) with the 'Klass' Case (1978) 2 EHRR (finding government
wire-tapping a violation of Article 8).
230 See Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Res 428 (23 January 1970).
231 See e.g. Attorney-Generalfor Canada v Attorney-GeneralforOntario [1937] AC 326, 347. In
Western Europe only Ireland and Iceland join the United Kingdom in failing to give even
limited effect to international agreements. See Golsong, 'The European Convention on Human
Rights Before Domestic Courts' 38 Brit YB Int'lL 445, 445 (1962).
229
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exception to this doctrine. 232 Thus, the Convention provides no basis for bringing
an action at law in England. 2 3 At one time, the courts began to admonish
234
including
government officials to 'bear in mind' the Convention's principles
2
Article 8's right to respect for family life. " Soon, however, the courts cut back on
this application of the Convention, on the grounds that Article 8 was 'so wide as
to be incapable of practical application' to administrative practices. 23 6 Though the
English courts have at times interpreted other broadly drafted international
conventions more flexibly and freely,23 7 the Convention's sweeping
238
pronouncements are themselves considered incapable of judicial interpretation
and only grudgingly adverted to as guides to the interpretation of domestic
statutes. 239 Like the official pronouncements of the Government to the Council of
Europe, judicial decisions tend to assume that existing law adequately protects all
240
the rights mentioned in the European Convention.
The European Convention does operate of its own force in actions brought
directly in the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. 241 Thus, in 1980 an
English company brought before the European Court, albeit unsuccessfully, an
action against European Commission inspectors for their surprise search of its
office premises and records.2 42 The jurisdictional ambit within which such suits
can be brought is very limited. 243 The United Kingdom has, in addition, signed
to
the Optional Clause to the 1950 Convention giving its subjects the right 244
Strasbourg.
in
Rights
Human
of
Court
European
the
to
directly
petition
Although this too provides a route for privacy protection, 245 the administrative
obstacles facing a petitioner are truly formidable. 246 Even so, opportunities for
232 See e.g. 596 HansardHC( 5 th ser) 333-34 (1958).
233 See Golsong, supra n 231, 446.

234 SeeR v Secretary of Statefor the Home Dep't, exparte Bhajan Singh [1976] QB 198, 207.
235 See R v Secretary of Statefor the Home Dep't, exparte Phansopkar[1976] QB 6o6, 626, 628.
236 See R v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamat Bibi [1976] 1 WLR
979, 984-85.
237 See James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding& Shipping (UK) Ltd[ 19 7 7] QB 2o8, 213,
aff'd on other grounds, 11978] AC 141.
238 See Crawford, 'Decisions of British Courts during 1976-1977' 48 Brit YB Int'l L 333, 351
(1978).

239 See e.g. Pan-American World Airways Inc v Department of Trade [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 257,
261-62.

240 But see R v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamat Bibi [1976] 1
WLR 979, 984-85.
241 See Firma J. Nold KG v Commission of the European Communities [1974] CJ Comm E Rec
491, 5o8 [1974] 1 CMLR 338, 354 (European Convention on Human Rights incorporated into
Community law); Pescatore, 'Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the System of the European
Communities' 18 Am Y Comp L 343 (1970).
242 NationalPanasonic(UK) Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1981] ICR 5'.
243 See Jaconelli, supran 228, 230.

244 See European Convention, supra n 8, Optional Protocol.
245 See infra 365.

246 See O'Hanlon, 'The Guarantees Afforded by the Institutional Machinery of the Convention' in
A. Robertson ed, Privacy andHuman Rights (1973) 307, 3o8; A. Robertson, Human Rights in
Europe 2nd ed (1977) 203-12.
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adjudication of privacy claims under Article 8 of the Convention in these
international tribunals may have the indirect effect of spurring the creation of
domestic remedies to forestall unfavourable world publicity.24
International pressure of a different sort has recently been put on Britain to
catch up with other European Community members in explicit protection of
individual privacy. Western European nations with high levels of privacy
protection for personal information contained in public and private computer data
banks within their borders have threatened to refuse to allow transmission of such
information to countries without such safeguards. 248 In response, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted a Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.249 The
Data Convention imposes restrictions on the gathering of personal information for
250
automated processing and a right of individual access to automated files.
Signatories to the Data Convention could refuse to transmit information about an
individual's race, politics, religion, sexual life, or criminal convictions to a country
whose domestic law lacked 'appropriate safeguards'. 21 Britain signed the new
convention in i98r, but the Thatcher Government introduced no legislation to
implement it domestically until the end of 1982,252 and in the absence of legislation
this highly technical area provides little incentive for judicial innovation.
V.

RECENT JUDICIAL INITIATIVES

A. Privateproperty
In the twentieth century, the Englishman's castle is not the potent symbol of
individualism and self-reliance it once was.2 53 The use of violence to ward off
public and private invasions of the domestic castle has been closely circumscribed
by codification of the criminal law of self-defence.25 4 At the same time, legislation
247

248
249

250
251
252

253
254

See e.g. Jaconelli, supra n 228, 227 and n 7. Cf Raymon v Honey [1982] 2 WLR 465 (access to
court broadened after decision of European Court of Human Rights).
See Evans, 'Computers and Privacy: The New Council of Europe Convention' 13o New LY
io67 (1980), 'Privacy-We Don't Worry, We're British' Economist 25 October i98o, 81.
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, adopted 17 September i98o.
Ibid., Arts 5, 8.
Ibid., Art 6.
See Jefferson and Thornberry, 'European Convention on Data Processing' i26 Sol Y 5 (1982);
supra, 349.
See e.g. D. Watkinson and M. Reed, Squatting, Trespassand CivilLiberties(1976) 41; Hewitt,
'The Englishman's Front Door' 36 New Statesman 435, 435-36 (1948).
See Criminal Law Act 1967, s 3(): 'A person may use such force as is reasonable in the
circumstances in the prevention of crime'; R v Barrett, unreported decision of the Court of
Appeal, 23 June 198o (defendant's honest belief that his home was his castle to defend by all
necessary force was of no avail). For the earlier view of defence of the home, see Townley v
Rushworth (1963) 6z LGR 95, 98; R v Hussey (1924) 18 Crim App R 16o, x6s. The castle
privilege against the sheriff remains. See Southam v Smout [1964]1 QB 3o8, 320; Swales v Cox
[i98i] QB 849, 855.
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has authorized many new penetrations of the family home by national and local
authorities for various purposes: to check water and electricity usage, to monitor
television licences and so forth.2 5 New restrictions on the individual owner's use
of property have also multiplied with more crowded conditions and the increased
role of the State. 256 Nevertheless, the twentienth century has seen a great
willingness on the part of the courts to recognize and protect an interest in
privacy-more recently denominated a fundamental right to privacy-in a
257
number of contexts.
While landowners have continued to complain about overlooking by
neighbours, 258 the unwillingness of the nineteenth century courts to find implied
covenants of privacy remained in force until the 1950S. 259 Since then, the question
has arisen in the Lands Tribunal under statutory authority to discharge or modify
restrictive covenants. 260 In that forum, objectors have frequently been able to keep
covenants in force on the grounds that loss of privacy would result from the
modification. 261' Moreover, public works have been successfully challenged in the
courts when their purposes included providing a public promenade overlooking
hitherto private estates. 262 The actions of the Lands Tribunal have in effect
reversed the earlier judicial attitude of ignoring privacy interests, while at the

255 See J. Garner, An Englishman's Home Is His Castle? (1966) 3; P. Devlin, supra n 55, 18-19;
Haldane Club, The Law of Public Meeting and the Right of Search and Seizure (New Fabian
Research Bureau No 13, 1941) 23-24; Hewitt, supra - 253, 435-36. Early challenges to these
new powers of entry were occasionally successful in court, see Stroud v Bradbury [1952] 2 All
ER 76, 77, or if not, see Grove v Eastern Gas Board [1952] 1 KB 77, at least accomplished some
parliamentary retrenchment, see Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act 1954.
256 See J. Garner, supra n 255, 20 (1966) (planning permission, compulsory purchase, inspection).
257 See cases cited at n ii supra.
258 An explicit covenant to prevent overlooking would, of course, still be enforced. See Re
Henderson'sConveyance [1940] 1 Ch 835, 849.
259 See e.g. Owen v Gadd [1956] 2 QB 99, 107 (erection of scaffolding outside leased premises did
not breach covenant of peaceable and quiet enjoyment); Kelly v Battershell[1949] 2 All ER
o
83 , 836 (mere interference with privacy no derogation from landlord's grant to tenant); Browne
v Flower[ 1911 ] I Ch 226, 228 (dictum).
260 Law of Property Act 1925, 8 84().
261 See e.g. Re M. Howard(Mitcham) Ltd's Application (1956) 7 P & CR 219, 222 (application to
modify i899 restrictive covenant dismissed; avoidance of invasion of privacy was of
'considerable importance'); Re Munday's Application (1954) 7 P & CR 130, 131-32 (application
refused on grounds of loss of seclusion and privacy); Re Berridge'sApplication (1954) 7 P & CR
125, 127 (application granted on condition to provide screen of trees for garden privacy); Re
Sloggetts (Properties)Ltd's Application (1952) 7 P & CR 78, 83 (application refused on grounds
of injury to privacy and amenities of surrounding property). The volume of Lands Tribunal
cases decided since the mid-i9 5 os on this ground is too large to catalogue, see LEXIS, ENGLG
library, but more recently assertions of 'rights of privacy' in this context can be found. See e.g.
Re Davies's Application (1971) 25 P & CR 115, I 19.
262 See e.g. Webb v Minister of Housing & Local Gov't [1965] 1 WLR 755, 773 (compulsory
purchase order for construction of sea wall quashed; public promenade an improper purpose).
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same time the privacy of neighbouring landowners has become an explicit
263
consideration guiding local authorities in their grants of planning permission.
Intrusions by strangers falling short of physical trespass have twice failed to
elicit injunctive relief from the English courts in the past decade. The claim of
invasion of privacy was central to the plaintiff's argument in Bernstein v
Skyviews & General Ltd in 1977.264 Lord Bernstein of Leigh brought an action
for damages for trespass and injunctive relief when photographs of his country
265
estate were taken by the defendants' aeroplane flying over his property.
Griffiths J found the single overflight to be neither a trespass nor a nuisance,
though he recognized that 'constant surveillance' of a plaintiff's house from above
would be a 'monstrous invasion of privacy' for which a court might well grant
relief.266 The privacy claim was more incidental in the 'cricket case', Miller v

Jackson, decided by the Court of Appeal in the same year. 267 Landowners
adjoining a playing field sought an injunction against the local cricket club when,
season after season, a few long drives would invariably send cricket balls flying
into their garden, threatening damage and necessitating retrieval by the players.
Though damages would have been awarded on grounds of negligence and
nuisance, the injunction was not issued because, as Lord Denning put it, the
plaintiff's private interest 'in securing the privacy of his home and garden' was
268
outweighed by the public interest in preserving the institution of village cricket.
Privacy has not found a place among actionable nuisances, at least when
injunctive relief is sought.
Since 1921, the English courts have narrowly construed police powers of entry,
search, and seizure in the interest of 'the privacy of the Englishman's dwelling
house'.269 As Lord Denning announced in Ghani v Jones in 1970, the requirement
of reasonable grounds for searches and seizures was based on the principle that
the individual's 'privacy and his possessions are not to be invaded except for the
most compelling reasons'.210 Alongside the line of decisions following Ghani v

263 See e.g. Wakelin v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 77 LGR ios (upholding

264
265

266
267
268
269
270

refusal to grant planning permission based on privacy considerations). But see Chelmsford Corp
v Secretary of State for the Environment (97) 70 LGR 89, 95 (planning permission imposing
conditions relating to walls and fences for privacy and decoration held ultra vires).
[i 97 8] QB 479 .
Ibid., 484.
Ibid., 489. On a smaller scale, habitual 'peeping Toms' are still dealt with by the law. See R v
Dyson, The Times so April 1979, at 3,col 5.
[1977] QB 966.
Ibid., 981.
Great Central Ry Co v Bates [1921] 3 KB 578, 58, (opinion of Atkin LJ) (constable entered
warehouse as a trespasser, no liability for his injury in a fall).
[1970] 1 QB 693, 708. See also Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299,
307-08 (opinion of Lord Denning MR, applying the maxim 'every man's house is his castle').
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Jones,27 ' another series of cases has invoked the privacy interest to forbid any
official search whatever under statutes not explicitly allowing entry into homes.272
As most recently stated, 'Parliament should not be presumed to have authorized
any greater invasion of privacy than was expressly sanctioned'.273
Recent decisions in the House of Lords have developed each of these lines of
authority with explicit reference to the right of privacy. In Inland Revenue
Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd,274 although the judgment reversed a Court of
Appeal decision holding a broad search of documents unlawful,27 Lords
Wilberforce and Scarman in the majority and Lord Salmon in dissent all appealed
to the citizen's 'right to privacy', an important 'human right' limiting the State's
power to search homes, offices, and papers. 2 6 Morris v Beardmore27 construed
sections 8 and 9 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 to forbid intrusion into the home
but to allow the trial judge discretion in excluding evidence so obtained. Lord
Edmund-Davies, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Scarman, and Lord Roskill all made
mention of the right, Lord Scarman describing it as 'fundamental' both in the
common law and under the European Convention. 28 In the Rossminster decision,
moreover, the Law Lords explicitly charged the courts with enforcing this right to
27 9
privacy against police searches.
A new threat to the privacy of private property, the 'Anton Piller' order, 28 ° has
made the surprise tactics of police search and seizure available to plaintiffs in civil
suits, on a showing that evidence in a defendant's possession is likely to be
destroyed if subpoenaed by regular means. The procedure traces its origin to
2
Chancery's circumvention of the householder's protection in Semayne's Case. 11
Invasion of the defendant's privacy was a concern expressed in one of the first

271 See e.g. R v Thornley (1980) 72 Crim App R 302, 304 (license to enter premises granted by wife
and not revoked by husband); Frank Truman Export Ltd v MetropolitanPolice Comm'r [1977]
QB 952, 964 (documents held under search warrant for suspicion of fraud held privileged and
returned).

272 See e.g. R v Adams [198o] i QB 575, 579 - 8 o, 583 (interpreting Obscene Publications Act 1959,

s 2); Clowser v Chaplin (1981) 72 Crim App R 342, 353 (interpreting Road Traffic Act 1972, S
8); Congreve v Home Office [1976] QB 629, 649 (television licences); R v Surrey Quarter

Sessions Comm, ex parteTweedie (1963) 61 LGR 464, 467 (interpreting Education Act 1944, ss
36, 37). See also Hutton v Esher Urban Dist Council [1972] Ch 515, 523-24, rev'd, [1974] Ch
167. Cf Stott v Hefferon [1974] WLR 1270, 1273-74 (limiting the presumption; Parliament
intends that premises only be protected if actually inhabited).
273
274
275
276
277
278
279

Clowser v Chaplin (1981) 72 Crim App R 342, 353 (opinion of Donaldson LJ).
[198o] AC 952.
R v InlandRevenue Comm'rs, exparte Rossminster [198o] AC 952.
Ibid., 997, 1019, 1022.
[19 8i] AC 4 4 6.
Ibid., 462, 464-65, 465.
InlandRevenue Comm'rs v Rossminster Ltd [198o] AC 952, 997.

28o So named from the leading case. See Anton PillerKG v ManufacturingProcessesLtd [1976] Ch
55.
281 See East India Co v Kynaston (1821) 3 Bli 153, 163-64, 4 Eng Rep 561, 564.
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283
Anton Piller cases. 28 2 This concern has surfaced again in two 198o decisions,
one of them grounded explicitly on the 'rights of privacy' and on the maxim that
'an Englishman's home is his castle'. 284

B. Confidentialcommunication
The security of communications by letter, telegram and telephone from official
285
Although
and unofficial interception remains a subject of concern in England.
287
286
and damage actions have succeeded against detectives
criminal prosecutions
for unofficial acts of wire-tapping, courts have held admissible evidence obtained
28 8
In the 1979 Malone
by tapping and by other forms of electronic eavesdropping.
decision, Megarry V-C rejected a challenge to police wire-tapping based on an
asserted right to privacy, 289 but he held out the possibility of judicial recognition
290
Megarry V-C's opinion also
of such a right against unofficial interception.
official wire-tapping practices may
suggested that future scrutiny of England's 291
well proceed under the European Convention.
282 EMILtdvPandit[19 7 5 ]I WLR 302, 305.
283 Thermax v Schott Industrial Glass Ltd (1980) 7 Fleet Street R 289, 298; Yousif v Salama
[198o] i WLR 1540, 1544 (Donaldson LJ dissenting).
284 Thermax v Schott Industrial Glass Ltd, supra n 283, 298 (opinion of Browne-Wilkinson J). See
also ITC Film DistributionsLtd v Video Exch Ltd, The Times 18 November 1981, at 18, col 5
(quoting this passage).
285 See e.g. The Interceptionof Communications in Great Britain, supra n 192; Birkett Committee,
supra n 163; Duffy and Muchlinski, 'The Interception of Communications in Great Britain' 130
New L_7 999 (198o); Nathan, 'Eavesdropping' (Parts 1-3) 225 Law Times I9, 135, 149 (1958);
Wade, 'Post-Office-Interception of Messages' [1958] Camb L7 6.
286 R v Blackburn, The Times 6 June 1974, at 4, col 3 (telephone tapping) (judgment of Nield J).
'[W]hatever the legal technicalities, this offence constituted a very serious invasion of privacy';
cited in Directorof Public Prosecutionsv Withers [1975] AC 842, 866, R v Withers, The Times
17 June 1971, at 1, col 2 (bugging of bedroom for divorce evidence was conspiracy to commit
trespass) (judgment of Roskill J) ('serious breaches of a citizen's right to privacy in his own
home'); R v Sergeant, The Times ii August 1967, at 3, col 1 (bugging to obtain industrial
secrets). The medieval criminal offence of eavesdropping was judicially disapproved, see R v
London Quarter Sessions [1948] 1 KB 670, 675 and was abolished in 1967, see Criminal Law
Act 1967, s I3(i)(a).
287 Sheen v Clegg, Daily Telegraph 22 June 196i.
288 R v Robson [1972] 1 WLR 651; R v Senat (1968) 52 Crim App R 282, 286-87; Gabbitas v
Gabbitas, The Times 5 December 1967, at 3, col 1 (evidence obtained by bugging wife's
bedroom); Trehearne v Trehearne, The Times 18 October 1966, at 9, col i (evidence obtained
by bugging husband's bedroom, though 'a disgraceful invasion of privacy', was admitted); R v
Maqsud Ali [1966] i QB 688, 702 (opinion of Marshall J) 'The method of the informer and of
the eavesdropper is commonly used in the detection of crime'; R v Mills [1962] 1 WLR 1152,
'157. Intercepted letters appear to have been offered in evidence at criminal trials very rarely.
See e.g. R v O'Brien, The Times 5 July 1923, at 1i, cl 4 (Irish seditious conspiracy trial); R v
Atterbury (Bishop) (1723) i6 Howell St Tr 323, 332-35 (treasonable conspiracy).
289 [1979] Ch 344. The 'inalienable human right' to privacy was early invoked against wire-tapping
in Nathan, supra n 285, 120.
290 [1979] Ch 372 ('[T]here has to be a first time for everything').
291 See [1979] Ch 380; Wacks, supra n 23, 74 n 8. The plaintiff has indeed sought this relief. See
The Times 27 July 198i, at 3, col 3; The Times 5 November 198o, at 6, col i.
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Evidentiary privileges2 92 have been supplemented by new legal protections for
communications made in judicial proceedings. Court-ordered discovery creates
obligations of confidentiality on the basis of a 'public interest in preserving
privacy', announced by Lord Denning in Riddick v Thames Board Mills, a 1977
decision.293 This principle has prevented the use of discovered information in
other suits against the party making discovery294 and has provided limitations on
the scope of discovery. 29 Most recently, in Harman v Secretary of State for the
Home Department,296 the House of Lords upheld a Court of Appeal decision in
which Lord Denning elevated the 'public interest' of the Riddick case to 'one of
our fundamental human rights' and Templeman LJ joined him in an appeal to this
'right to privacy'. 297 Discovery, said Lord Roskill, 'involves invasion of an
otherwise absolute right to privacy', but neither this supposed right nor a 'right to
freedom of information' could be rigidly applied in this area. 298 Just as
communications between client and attorney earned legal protection because of
their central importance to the conduct of litigation, documents made available to
the opposing party in litigation now bear strict safeguards formulated explicitly in
privacy terms.
Two attempts in the mid-1970s to restrain the publication of matters disclosed
299
in the privacy of wardship proceedings failed to win over the Court of Appeal,
although one of them did provoke Lord Denning to express the need for a 'general
remedy for infringement of privacy'.300 Suits for breach of confidence, relying on
Albert v Strange30 1 and the trade secret cases,30 2 have met with more success in
preventing public disclosure of communications made confidentially. A pair of
cases on public relations employees disclosing information about their principals
292 The privacy basis of the husband-wife privilege was eroded in Rumping v Director of Public
Prosecutions [1964] AC 814, 832 (no privilege against 'disclosure by a witness who was an
eavesdropper or who had intercepted or stolen a letter from one spouse to the other').
293 [1977] QB 881, 895, 896.
294 Ibid.; Medway v Doublelock Ltd[1 9 7 8] 1 WLR 71o, 713 (quoting this passage).
295 See Church of Scientology of California v Department of Health and Social Security [1979 1
WLR 723, 728; Halcon Int'l Inc v Shell Transp & Trading Co [I979] Pat Cas 97, 107.
296 [1982] 2 WLR 338.
297 Home Office v Harman[1981] QB 534, 557, 558.

298 [1982] 2 WLR 361 (opinion of Lord Roskill). See also [1982] 2 WLR 351, 358 (Lord Scarman,
dissenting).
299 Re F (a minor) [1977] Fam 58, 98; Re X (a minor) [1975] Fam 47, 58. See also Barritt v
Attorney-General [1971] 1 WLR 1713, 1714 (in exercising discretion to proceed in camera,

courts weigh effect of publicity and disclosure of family secrets). The origin of the protection
afforded private and domestic affairs in wardship proceedings is Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417,
482-83.
300 ReX (a minor) [1975] Fam 47, 8 (opinion of Lord Denning MR).
301 (1848) 2 De G & Sm 652, 64 Eng Rep 293, aff'd (1849) 1 Mac & G 25, 41 Eng Rep 1171.
302 Morrison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng Rep 492, aff'd (1852) 21 LJ Ch (NS) 248

(injunction to restrain former partner from making medicine by secret method); Yovatt v
Winyard (182o) I J & W 394, 37 Eng Rep 425 (injunction to restrain journeyman from
disclosing recipes of medicines on grounds of breach of trust and confidence).
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in breach of confidence show the close relation of this new action 3 03 to privacy
interests. In one case, the injunction was refused on the ground that the publicityseeking plaintiffs 'were in no position to complain of an invasion of their privacy'
by the defendants' disclosures.3" 4 In the other decision, that 'fundamental human
right', the 'right of privacy', outweighed the right of the press to keep the public
informed, and the injunction issued. 3 5
The action for breach of confidence extends to intimate details of domestic
affairs as well as commercial secrets.30 6 It prevents disclosure not only by those in
whom the confidence has been reposed but also by third parties who acquire the
sensitive information. 30 7 In the twentieth century counterpart to Albert v Strange,
the Duke of Argyll was restrained from publishing details of his divorce
proceedings, including his estranged wife's private diary.30 Ungoed-Thomas J, in
issuing the injunction, quoted Lord Cottenham's 1849 pronouncement that
'privacy is the right invaded'.30 9 Argyll v Argyll sums up the legal protection of
confidential communications in England: the property interest of the writer in
sentiments confided to paper, the implied bond of confidentiality in the marital
relationship, the limitations on testimony and documents discovered in judicial
proceedings, and the privacy interest at the heart of the action of breach of
confidence.
C. Personalinformation
Collection, storage, and use of sensitive personal information in public and private
organizations has accelerated in twentieth century England,310 and with it has
increased the level of privacy concerns reaching the courts. As government's
303 See G. Dworkin, Confidence in the Law (97i);

304

305
3o6
307

3o8

Jones, 'Restitution of Benefits Obtained in
Breach of Another's Confidence' 86 LQ Rev 463 (1970); North, 'Breach of Confidence: Is There
a New Tort?' 12 JSPTL 149 (1972). See also Hammond, 'The Origins of the Equitable Duty of
Confidence' 8 Anglo-Am L Rev 71 (1979).
Woodward v Hutchins [1977] i WLR 760, 764 (opinion of Bridge LJ).
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1, 21 (opinion of Lord Denning MR,
dissenting in part).
See e.g. Coco vA. N. Clark (Engineers)Ltd [1969] Pat Cas 41, 5o; Fraserv Evans [1969] i QB
349, 361.
Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 Pat Cas 203, 213,
[1963] 3 All ER 413, 414 (opinion of Lord Greene MR) ('[T]he obligation to respect confidence
is not limited to cases where the parties are in contractual relationship. .. . If a defendant is
proved to have used confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff,
with the consent, express or implied of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the
plaintiff's rights').
Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302, discussed in Cline, 'The Argyll Decision' 213 Spectator 837
(1964) ('a decisive step towards a new law of privacy').

309 [1 9 67 ] Ch 32o.
31o See e.g. Computers: Safeguards for Privacy (HMSO 1975) Cmnd 6354; Lindop Committee,
supra n 197; B. Rowe ed, Privacy, Computers and You (1972); J. Rule, Private Lives and
Public Surveillance (1973); P. Sieghart, Privacy and Computers (1976); 'Computers and
Privacy' 128 New LJ 4 23 (1978).
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information demands have multiplied, fears of gossip by local enumerators311 have
given way to court challenges directed against the entire regime of data
collection. 312 The potential for unauthorized access to recorded information about
individuals was highlighted in Director of Public Prosecutions v Withers, an
unsuccessful prosecution of a detective agency for 'conspiracy ... to invade
privacy' by impersonating bank officers to obtain confidential financial reports.313
More recently, again in the name of privacy, courts have protected bank records
from government 'fishing expeditions' of various kinds.314 But the impact of the
courts on public and private recordkeeping practices has on the whole been
315
negligible.
English courts have made more of an effort to minimize the intrusions on
privacy caused by their own proceedings, thus adding to the small arsenal of legal
protections for personal information. For example, a strong showing of necessity
316
must be made to justify invasions of a party's privacy by medical examinations,
317
body searches,
and blood tests.318 Litigants are also given some protection
through requirements of confidentiality in wardship 31 9 and divorce cases, 320 as
well as for documents disclosed in discovery. The truth-seeking function of the
courts must give way, as Lord Fraser remarked in a 1983 decision of the House of
Lords, when a litigant decides to 'withhold information that would help his case
...for reasons of delicacy or personal privacy'. 2 1 Moreover, in a number of recent
cases, courts have acted to prevent disclosure of the private affairs of non-parties.
On grounds of privacy protection, courts have refused to compel the parents of
divorcing spouses to disclose the testamentary provisions they have made, 322 and
have refused to order disclosure of confidential employee records in employment
discrimination suits.3 2 3 Likewise, they have sought to prevent 'jury vetting', the
collection of official record information about members of jury panels by
prosecution and defence lawyers, again in the name of the juryman's 'right of
privacy'. 324 Most recently, the Court of Appeal has applied the 'individual's right
311 Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410, 421. See also a related case of the same name,

[1912] i Ch 158. The same fear had been expressed in 'The Census', supra n 139, 424.
312 Turner v Midgely [i967] 1 WLR 1247, 1252, Willcock v Muckle [1951] 2 KB 844.

313
314
315
316

Directorof PublicProsecutionsv Withers [1975] AC 842, 863 (opinion of Lord Simon).
Clinch v Inland Revenue Comm'rs [1974] QB 76, 87 (opinion of Ackner J).
More is expected of Parliament and the European Community. See supra 349-353.
Starr v NationalCoalBoard[1977] 1 WLR 63, 75.

317 Lindley v Rutter [198i ] QB 128, 134.
318 S v S [1972] AC 24, 57 (quoting Bednarik v Bednarik, 18 NJ Misc 633, 652, 16 A 2d 8o, 90
(1940)).
319 See supra n 358.
P
320 M v M (No 1)[19 6 7 ] 31 3 , 31 5 ; Edwards v Edwards[1 9 68] IWLR 149, 149.
321 Air Canadav Secretary of State for Trade [x983] 1 All ER 91o, 916. See supra 357-358.
322 See Wv W, The Times 21 March 1981, at 6, col 6, Morgan v Morgan [1977] Fam 122, 123, 125.
323 Science Research Council v Nassb [198o] AC 1028, io85.
324 R v Crown Court at Sheffield, ex parte Brownlow [198o] 1 QB 530, 542 (opinion of Lord

Denning MR). But see R v Mason [1981] QB 881 (condoning practice).
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to privacy' in limiting statutory 32
powers
to inspect individual bank accounts of
5
nonparties for litigation purposes.
Having put its own house in order, the English judiciary remains reluctant to
safeguard personal information further by enforcing broad privacy protections
against the press. The House of Lords rejected an explicit privacy remedy against
the press in Tolley v Fry,3 26 and actions for damages on the explicit ground of
privacy invasion have not been successful, 3 27 although the courts have on occasion
upheld awards of damages for the publication of truthful information about
private persons and of photographs. 32 There remains hope, however, for judicial
creativity in this area as well. In the 1980 case of British Steel Corp v Granada
Television Ltd, Lord Denning assumed the availability of a privacy tort against
the excesses of irresponsible 'investigative journalism' :329
[T]he plaintiff has his remedy in damages against the newspaper-or sometimes an
injunction; and that should suffice. It may be for libel. It may be for breach of copyright. It
may be for infringement of privacy. The courts will always be ready to grant an injunction
to restrain a publication which is an infringement of privacy.
In a series of rapid-fire proceedings in December 1982 concerning a hotel's
attempt to enjoin the broadcasting of a surreptitiously recorded television film of
325 R v Grossman(198i) 73 Crim App R 302, 308, 309.
326 [193I] AC 333. The case was interpreted variously by American commentators. See e.g. Green,
'The Right of Privacy' 27 Ill L Rev 237, 294 n 23 (1932) (the theory of the case would give
recovery in libel for the invasion of privacy claim in Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co 171
NY 538, 64 NE 442 (19o2)); Recent Decisions 32 Mich L Rev 1172, 1172 n 5 (1934) (the
decision 'seemingly recogniz[es] the right of privacy in England'); Recent Cases 16 Minn L Rev
220, 221 (1932) (the case 'somewhat extend[s] the action for libel to accomplish the result ... of
the right of privacy').
327 See e.g. Briant v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyd's LR 533, 534; Byrne v
KinematographRenters Soc'yLtd[9 5 8] I WLR 762, 777.
328 See e.g. Williams v Settle [i96o] i WLR 1072, 1082 (opinion of Sellers J) (publication of
wedding picture after bride's father had been murdered was a violation of copyright and
'intrusion into his life, deeper and graver than an intrusion into a man's property'), discussed in
Cline, 'Invasion of Privacy' 204 Spectator 88o (196o): '[T]he court was in effect punishing the
defendant for an unscrupulous invasion of the plaintiff's privacy'; Webb v Times Publishing Co
[1960] 2 QB 535, 569 (opinion of Pearson J) (defamatory article not fair comment or privileged
if it appeals to 'an interest which is due to idle curiosity or a desire for gossip'); Plumb v Jeyes'
Sanitary Compounds Co Ltd, The Times 15 April 1937, at 4, col 4 (jury award for unauthorized
publication of photograph). See also Moore v News of the World [1972] 1 QB 441 (false
attribution of authorship in fictitious 'interview' about private life). See generally R. O'Sullivan
and R. Brown, The Law of Defamation (1958) 1-12 (once defamation is established, jury may
take into consideration invasion of privacy). For a remarkable case, holding that a legal
periodical's opinion about the criminality of a particular reporter's invasive tactic was not
libelous, see Lea v Justice of the Peace Ltd, The Times, 15 March 1947, at 2, col 7 (opinion of
Hilbery J) ('It could not be too strongly emphasized that in this country the Press has no right
to go on private property and intrude into people's lives'.); H. Hyde, Privacy and the Press
(1947).
329 [i981] AC 5O96, 1129-30; [1981] AC 1189 (opinion of Lord Salmon quoting this passage in
part).

362

ENGLISH JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT TO PRIVACY

its interior, Comyn J speculated that the pleadings might be amended to include a
claim based on the 'emergent tort' of invasion of privacy, though he was 'not
disposed to be the first to break new ground on that front' at the interlocutory
stage, and on appeal Watkins LJ also anticipated that the future action for
damages would raise 'such interesting matters as the law of privacy ... and the
330
question of the attitude of the courts to the claim of the press to report at will.'
The English courts from highest to lowest have expressed in recent years a
willingness to speak of the right to privacy, and in the appropriate case to give it
force, even when this nascent right comes into conflict with existing rights to free
expression and the vested interest of a powerful press.

VI.

ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

A. The scope of the right
How far have the English courts taken the fledgling right to privacy? In a dozen or
so reported decisions, all within the last four years, English judges have explicitly
invoked such a right, though without taking the final step of creating a new legal
right of action in tort. 331 The House of Lords has made three such
pronouncements. First, through the power of the courts to hold searches and
seizures unlawful, the right to privacy prevents abuses of statutory powers of
search by government officers.33 2 Secondly, as a tool of statutory construction, the
right forbids government officers to force their way into private homes without
explicit authorization of an Act of Parliament and, further, gives judicial discretion
(at least in some circumstances) to exclude evidence obtained in an unauthorized
entry.333 Thirdly, in the context of civil litigation, the right limits a party's use of
documents obtained through discovery, making wider disclosure of such
documents a contempt of court. 33 4 In the Court of Appeal the right to privacy has
grounded even more restrictive constructions of statutory powers of search, 335 as
well as injunctions against the publication of information obtained in
confidence, 336 and refusals by the Court itself to assist litigants in obtaining
criminal records by jury members 337 and bank records of other nonparties 3 s In
the Chancery Division the right has occasioned refusal to order surprise searches
of defendants' premises in civil cases,339 and in the Queen's Bench Division it has
330 Savoy Hotel v BCC, The Times 18 December 1982 (granting the injunction); reversed in an
unreported decision of the Court of Appeal, 2o December 1982.
331 See cases cited in n ii supra.
332 InlandRevenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [198o] AC 952.
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Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446.
Harman v Secretary of Statefor the Home Dep't [198212 WLR 338.
R v Thornley(198O) 72 Crim App R 302, R vAdams [I98O] 1 QB 575.
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [ 1982] QB i.
R v Crown Court at Sheffield, exparteBrownlow [i98o] QB 530.

338 R v Grossman (1981) 73 Crim App R 302.

339 Thermax Ltd v Schott Industrial Glass Ltd (1 9 8o) 7 Fleet Street R 289.

DAVID J. SEIPP

struck down police regulations on body searches of arrested persons.34 ° Finally, in
dicta of the Court of Appeal quoted with approval in the House of Lords, some
English judges have assumed the existence of a remedy for infringement of privacy
by publication of confidential information. 341 This judicial recognition of a right to
privacy in a broad range of contexts, the culmination of a decade or more of
decisions focusing explicitly on privacy interests,342 delineates the present scope of
a healthy, exuberant new branch of English common law. Privacy law, no longer
the interstitial and incidental by-product of other doctrines, is about to come into
its own.
Needless to say, the Englishman's right to privacy is not absolute.34 3 It remains
in conflict with other rights, values, and interests. The cases recognizing the right
show this inherent tension. One countervailing consideration is 'the interest which
the public has in preventing evasions of the law', 344 phrased more particularly in
these cases as 'the public interest in the detection and punishment of tax frauds'345
and 'its desire to stamp out drunken driving'. 346 Another interest limiting privacy
in civil litigation is 'the public interest in discovering the truth so that justice may
be done between the parties'. 347 Finally, there is of course the 'freedom of
expression' embodied in 'the right of the press to inform the public, and the
corresponding right of the public to be properly informed'. 341 It is in conflict with
this lattermost right, the robust freedom of the English press, that the right to
privacy shows its true vigor and promise. Its victories over interests in effective
law enforcement and in the courtroom search for truth would not be nearly so
impressive if the right to privacy did not also prevail occasionally over the well349
guarded liberty of the press.
On first sight, the litigants who have won for the Englishman his right to
privacy appear to be an unlikely assortment of characters. Just as the principal
beneficiaries of an explicit right to privacy in the nineteenth century were the
Royal family, 350 it would seem fair to say that the rights most often vindicated by
340 Lindley v Rutter [g81] QB 128.

341 British Steel Corp v GranadaTelevision Ltd [1981] AC lO96.
342

See supra 353-362.

343 See e.g. Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Dep't [1982] 2 WLR 338, 361, Lindley v
Rutter[1981] QB 128, 134.
344 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [198o ] AC 952, 997 (opinion of Lord
Wilberforce).
345 [198o] AC 1021 (opinion of Lord Scarman).
346 Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446, 465 (opinion of Lord Scarman).
347 Riddick v Thames Board Mills [1977] QB 881, 895, 896 (opinion of Lord Denning MR),
paraphrased in Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Dep't [1982] 2 WLR 338, 349
(opinion of Lord Keith of Kinkel).
348 Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1, 21 (Lord Denning MR, dissenting in
part).
349 The same can be said of the American development. See Note, supra n 13.
350 Albert (Prince)v Strange (1848) 2 De G & Sm 652, 64 Eng Rep 293, aff'd, (1849) x Mac & G
25, 41 Eng Rep 1171.
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the recent cases have been those of limited companies and governmental entities.
An international drug company,351 a nationalized industry35 2 and the Home
Office353 have joined the householder, 354 the individual shopkeeper,355 and the
disorderly conduct defendant" 6 as successful contenders for a right to privacy.
Perhaps these vast institutions could better absorb the legal costs for what must
have appeared at the outset of their cases an almost hopeless line of argument.
Perhaps the courts have simply seized upon the first cases to come before them in
which the right could be recognized. The language of all the decisions, at any rate,
consistently treats privacy as a 'human' right, one belonging to the 'individual'.
Thus, in a case involving the search of a company's offices, Lords Wilberforce,
Scarman, and Salmon were all careful to invoke the individual citizen's right to
privacy in his own home, an important and basic human right.357 Despite the
character of the litigants so far successful in asserting this right in the courts, it is
evident that the English judiciary are keeping the central focus of the nascent right
to privacy on the individual Englishman, his home, and his private life.
B. Sources of the right
What influence has the American right to privacy had on its English counterpart?
American privacy cases are discussed only rarely in the opinions, when counsel are
willing to cite them and judges to consider them. Megarry V-C, for instance, gave
extensive consideration to leading American cases on wire-tapping in his rejection
of a privacy argument in the Malone decision. 358 Lord Denning, in his Court of
Appeal decision in British Steel Corp v GranadaTelevision Ltd,359 brought many
American decisions on privacy and the press to the attention of the House of
Lords. The Law Lords had earlier adopted the privacy language of a New Jersey
case on the legality of compulsory blood testing,360 and most recently, in the 1982
Harman decision, Lord Scarman referred to American cases balancing the
confidentiality of discovered documents and the freedom of the press. 6' By and
large, however, the American law of privacy informs the English debate only
indirectly, as a background presence not fully understood in detail but felt
nevertheless to lend some credibility to claims of legal protection for privacy in
England.
351 Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB i.
352
353
354
355
356
357
358

British Steel Corp v GranadaTelevision Ltd [1981] AC io96.
Harmanv Secretary of Statefor the Home Dep't [1982] 2 WLR 338.
Morris v Beardmore [i981] AC 446.
RvAdams[ig8o] i QB 575.
Lindley v Rutter [i981] QB iz8.
InlandRevenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [198o] AC 952, 997, 1019, 1022.
[1979] Ch 344, 358-59 (citing Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967), Rhodes v Graham, 238
Ky 225,
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SW 2d 46 (1931)).

359 [i81] AC io96.
360 S v S [1972] AC 24, 57 (opinion of Lord Hodson quoting Bednarik v Bednarik, 18 NJ Misc
633, 652, 16 A 2d 80, 90 (1940)).
361 [1982] 2 WLR 338, 358.
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Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights362 has likewise played
only an indirect role in the formulation of an English right to privacy. In the
Malone decision, Megarry V-C weighed and rejected an argument from the
European Convention. 63 Lord Denning, on the other hand, referred to Article 8 of
the Convention in Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd, in support of the
contention that the right to privacy is a 'fundamental human right',364 as did Lord
Scarman in Morris v Beardmore.365 Terming a right 'fundamental', Scarman
admitted, 'has an unfamiliar ring in the ears of common lawyers',36 6 but the
language of fundamental human rights is frequently encountered in recent English
decisions on privacy. The European Convention is a background force, an
international legal norm of uncertain weight and uncertain scope. Its promise of
an external forum for privacy claims rejected by the English courts3 67 does,
however, provide an extra spur to recognition of the new right that the American
example can never supply.
Ultimately, as Lord Scarman noted in the 1982 Harman decision, 'neither
American law nor the European Convention can be decisive ... , but both are
powerfully persuasive-the Convention because its observance is an obligation of
the United Kingdom, and American law because of its common law
character'-yet each of these sources, he added, 'reinforces conclusions which we
draw independently from our own legal principles'.36 The common law of
England has itself given birth to the right to privacy. Authority for limiting the
intrusions of the State has been found in the strongly-worded judgments of the
Court of Common Pleas in the eighteenth century cases striking down general
369
Authority for limiting the
search warrants, principally Entick v Carrington.
inroads of the press and other unofficial intruders has been found in Albert v
Strange.370 When neither of these precedents seems appropriate, the courts are
371
thrown back on the still vigorous maxim 'an Englishman's house is his castle'.
All this is not to say that the right must have some constitutionalforce of its own.
In all the recent cases applying a right to privacy, English judges have not been
See 351-353 and n 8 supra.
363 [1979] Ch 344, 354.
364 [1 9 82] QB 1, 21.
362

365 [1981] AC 446, 464-65.
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367
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Ibid.
See supra 353.
[1982] 2 WLR 338, 358.
See Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693, 7o8 (citing Entick v Carrington(1765) 19 Howell St Tr
1029, 2 Wils KB 275, 95 Eng Rep 807); Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446, 464-65 (citing
same). But see Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [198o] AC 952, 997 (opinion
of Lord Wilberforce, distinguishing the eighteenth century cases).
370 See Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302, 320 (quoting Albert v Strange (1849) i Mac & G 25, 47, 41
Eng Rep 1171, 1179); British Steel Corp v GranadaTelevision Ltd [1981] AC 1O96, 1129-30

(citing same).
371 See e.g. Thermax Ltd v Schott IndustrialGlass Ltd (1980) 7 Fleet Street R 289,
maxim).
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embarrassed by the constitutional difficulties encountered by proponents of a Bill
of Rights. Their privacy protections extend to civil actions, limitations on their
own court procedures, and construction of statutes, but not to abrogation of
statutes altogether. Even so, members of the House of Lords have had
considerable experience with constitutional rights to privacy. In their role as
judges of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Law Lords have on
many occasions had to interpret written constitutions of Commonwealth members
guaranteeing a right to privacy." 2 The English courts, as comparative latecomers
to privacy law, have an abundance of sources upon which to draw.
C. Privacy in other English-languagejurisdictions
A quick review of the extent of privacy protection in other English-speaking
countries will show that England's recognition of a right to privacy has, by
comparison, come very late indeed. Scottish decisions since the nineteenth century
have gone beyond the English cases towards recognizing an explicit right of action
for invasions of privacy.373 In addition to warrantless searches374 and the activities
of peeping Toms, 3" police surveillance of a dwelling-house without probable
cause has been considered to give rise to a cause of action.376 Scottish courts based
their refusal to allow publication of private letters on the grounds of injury to
reputation and to feelings, rather than on the property grounds maintained by
English courts,377 and awarded damages for breach of an 'obligation to secrecy'
against a doctor who divulged intimate medical information.37 Scottish law
carried privacy protection furthest in opposition to press intrusions, settling by
the mid-nineteenth century that damages could be awarded for publications of
truthful information about 'some old and generally forgotten immoral act or act of
impropriety'379 or 'some physical deformity or secret defect'. 3 ° Personal ridicule
was only allowed, according to one Scottish judge, 'so long as the privacy of
domestic life is not invaded'. 381 In a 1916 decision of the House of Lords
372 See e.g. Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [198o] AC 319 (Bermuda); Hinds v The Queen
[1976] 2 WLR 366 (Jamaica); Francisv Chief of Police [1973] AC 761 (St Christopher, Nevis &
Anguilla); Akar v Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [1970] AC 853.
373 See e.g. D. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd ed, 703 et seq; Kilbrandon, 'The Law of
Privacy in Scotland' 2 Cambrian L Rev 35 (197i); Middleton, 'A Right to Privacy?' 8 JuridRev
(NS) 178 (i963).
374 See cases cited in D. Walker, supra n 373, 707.
375 See Raffaelli v Heatly 1949 SLT 284, 285-86.
376 See Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29, 48.
377 See Cadell v Davies (1864) Mor. Literary Property, Appendix pt s, no 4; G. Bell, Commentaries
on the Laws of Scotland, vol i, 11-12 (1st ed Edinburgh 1804) (7 th ed 1870). Cf Caird v Sime
(1887) 1 2 App Cas 326, 343 (lecturer retains right of property in spoken lecture).
378 AB v CD (1851) 14 D 177, 18o (opinion of Lord Fullerton).
379 Friend v Skelton (x855) 17 D 548, 555 n* (opinion of Lord Deas). See also Sheriff v Wilson
(I855) 17 D 528, 530 (effect of press ridicule on plaintiff's feelings).
380 Cunningham v Phillips(1868) 6 M 926, 928 (Lord Deas dissenting).
381 Ibid., 929.
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interpreting Scottish law, Lord Haldane LC invoked 'the right of a private
individual to have his character respected' and reminded the press that 'people
should not as private persons be exposed to unjustifiable and arbitrary
comment'.,1 2 These cases proceed on the broad principle of the actio injuriarum,
3
which affords remedies for affronts to reputation, honour, and feelings. "' Privacy
has fitted well within this scheme of values in Scottish law.
In Canada, experimentation with privacy remedies at the provincial level has
led to growing acceptance of a right to privacy nationwide.1 4 Quebec has
3 85
extended its version of the civil law actio injuriarum to invasions of privacy and
38
38 6
Ontario and Alberta have allowed damage actions and injunctive relief based
38 9
and
on a right to privacy. Three provinces, British Columbia, 8 8 Manitoba
390
have enacted statutes making wilful violation of privacy a tort.
Saskatchewan
Under these statutes, the Canadian courts have begun to work out the scope of the
new statutory right.3 9' The federal legislature has made wire-tapping and
electronic eavesdropping criminal offences under a 1973 Protection of Privacy
Act.392 The federal statute applies to official interceptions, rendering them
unlawful and inadmissible in evidence unless specifically authorized by a judge
applying very narrow criteria of overriding public interest. 39 3 The Act further
provides that punitive damages may be awarded to the victim of an unlawful
interception. 39 4 As one recent commentator has concluded, '[a]lthough many
provinces lack general privacy legislation, the combined effect of the extant

JohnLeng &Co Ltd vLanglands(1I6) 114 LT(NS) 665, 668.
383 See e.g. D. Walker, supra n 373, 703-704
384 See e.g. Aspects of Privacy Law, supra n 5; Burns, supra n 5. For an early complaint against
government intrusion into the home, seizure of papers, and interception of letters, see S.
Wilcocke, A Letter to the Solicitor General on the Seizure of Papers (Montreal 1821) 12-14
('[T]here are secrets which, though I would rather have died than have discovered,.., secrets of
thought and of conduct such as not any man has a right to look upon, and ... no color of law
has a right to expose') (emphasis omitted).
385 See Robbins v CRC (1957) 12 DLR (2d) 35, 42.
386 See Krouse v Chrysler Canada Ltd (1970) 12 DLR (3d) 463, 464 (refusing motion to dismiss),
decided on alternate grounds (1972) 25 DLR ( 3 d) 49, 56, rev'd (1974) 1 OR (2d) 258; Burnett v
The Queen in Right of Canada(1979) 23 OR (2d) lO9, 115.
387 See Motherwell v Motherwell (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 62, 78 (privacy in context of private
nuisance).
388 See British Columbia Privacy Act 1968. A 'common law right to privacy' was also incorporated
into the British Columbia Landlord and Tenant Act 196o, s 46 by Re Maclsaac(1972) 25 DLR
3 d 61o.
389 See Manitoba Privacy Act 1970.
390 See Saskatchewan Privacy Act 1974.
382

391 See e.g. Davis v McArthur (1971) 17 DLR ( 3 d) 76o.
392

1973-1974 Can Stat, Chap 5o. See generally D. Watt, Law of Electronic Surveillance in

Canada(1979).
393 Protection of Privacy Act, ss 178.13, 178. 16.
394 Ibid., s 178.21.
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common law, and provincial and federal legislation, grants Canadians a fair
measure' of privacy protection, 'perhaps as great as the United States' where the
common law right to privacy originated.3 95
The Australian High Court rejected a right to privacy in 1937. The decision in
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor refused relief to a
racetrack owner whose races were being watched, reported and broadcast to the
public from a platform on the neighbouring defendant's land.3 96 Prior to this
decision, Australian courts had indirectly come closer to privacy protection than
their English counterparts, by providing that truthful publications could be found
defamatory if they were not for the 'public benefit'.3 97 Since 1937, Australian
395
courts have given recognition to privacy interests against peeping Toms,
99
400
eavesdroppers,
and wire-tappers, but most of the recent developments have
been on the legislative front. In the past three years, the Australian Law Reform
Commission has pressed forward with proposals for statutory rights of action for
invasions of privacy by publication of 'sensitive private facts' concerning the
plaintiff,4 1 by intrusion into or secret surveillance of a plaintiff's home,40 2 and by
breach of privacy safeguards in personal information systems. 40 3 Some States have
already enacted privacy protections along these lines,40 4 but much will depend
upon the vigour with which the Australian Law Reform Commission pursues its
405
mission.
Among other Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions, South Africa was
early to recognize a right to privacy. 406 Like Scotland, it had long interpreted its
actio injuriarum to remedy, for example, shadowing of the plaintiff by a private
detective. 401 Several cases in the 1950s, all involving photographs of the plaintiffs
published to accompany newspaper gossip-column material, held that invasions of

395 Bums, supra n 5, 64.
396 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 495-96

397
398
399
400
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(opinion of Latham CJ) '[N]o authority was cited which shows that any general right of privacy
exists'.
See e.g. Mclsaacs v Robertson (1864) 3 NSW S Ct R 51, 54.
See Haismanv Smelcher [i953] VLR 625, 628.
Grieg v Grieg[1966] VR 379, 381.
R v Padman (1979) 36 FLR 347, 352. But see Miller v Miller (1978) 22 ALR 119.
Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy 130 (No i i,
1979).

402 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Intrusions 96 (Discussion Paper No 13,
198o).
403 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Personal Information 122 (Discussion Paper
No 14, 598o).
404 See e.g. Queensland Invasion of Privacy Act 1971, New South Wales Listening Devices Act

1969, Victoria Listening Devices Act 1969.
405 See Kirby, 'The Computer, the Individual, and the Law' 55 AustralianL 443 (1981).

406 See e.g. D. McQuoid-Mason, The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1978) 86-90.
407 See e.g. Epstein v Epstein 19o6 TH 87, 88.
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'the right of the plaintiff to personal privacy' constituted an injuria.4 °s English
judges in British India gained familiarity with a 'customary right of privacy'
necessitated by religious rules about the seclusion of women. 40 9 More recently, the
Supreme Court of India, with a nod to the American case of Griswold v
Connecticut,410 has held that 'the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely
throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent
right to privacy as an emanation from them', though this right found in their
'penumbral zones' is subject to restrictions in the public interest'. 411 Finally,
judges in the Sudan, another inheritor of the English common law, have recently
held that 'since privacy is as important to protect as peoples [sic] other property in
the light of the zeitgeist there is nothing as a matter of principle to hinder us from
receiving the American concept as to the invasion of privacy'. 412 So forthright a
judicial recognition could hardly be expected from the English courts, but the
comparison once again is instructive.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, tort law came into its own as a
doctrinal category of the common law. It was the synthesis of a number of
disparate actions, with a general principle of negligence informing most of its
applications. This development of tort law has since been explained as the
necessary response of the legal system to threats to life, limb, and property
brought on by the mechanical inventions of the industrial revolution. Of course,
developments in the realm of legal thought also played a part in the emergence of a
general theory of tort law. Once the subject had come into being through a
conjunction of material forces, human motives, and legal ideas, it took on a life of
its own, working a powerful transformation on the ways the law is conceived,
taught, and practised.
Privacy law is a new doctrinal category in the making. In England and
elsewhere it is coming to be perceived as a unified body of rules determining the
408 See Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370, 373 (opinion of Kuper J) '[A]n invasion of the plaintiff's
privacy' by the publication of a photograph 'constituted an aggression upon his dignitas';
Kidson v South Afr Assoc Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461, 467-68 (opinion of Kuper J)

publication of photograph with misleading article'infringed 'the right of the plaintiff to personal
privacy'; O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244, 249 (invasion of
privacy by newspaper photograph constitutes an injuria).
409 See e.g. Maneklal Motilal v Mohanlal Narotumdas(1919) 44 Indian LR Bombay 496, 498-99
(customary right of privacy); Gokal Prasadv Radho (1888) io Indian LR Allahbad 358, 385-87
(announcing recognition of a customary right to privacy after exhaustive review of previous
cases).
41o 381 US 4 7 9 , 4 84 (19 6 5).
411 Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh 1975 AIR (SC) 1378, 1385, 1386, [1975] 2 SCR 148, 157,
412

158 (opinion of Mathew J).
Mohamed Ahmed El Naeem v Adeel Osman (1970) Sudan LJ & R 8, 9 (opinion of Dafalla El
Radi Siddig J citing an English treatise on need for common law right to privacy).
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boundaries we may rely upon to keep out an intrusive world. Privacy law
recognizes that ours is not a world of hermits. Much privacy is freely waived, and
much is traded for benefits of other kinds. Nevertheless, some privacy is retained
by those who do not thrust themselves into the public eye, and courts are more
and more willing to recognize that that retained minimum of personal privacy
gives rise to legal obligations on the part of those who would intrude upon it.
Like the law of torts, privacy law has arisen, in part, as a response to new
inventions and modes of organization. If tort law was the product of the industrial
revolution, privacy is the result of a communications and information revolution.
Photography, microphones, telephones and computers have all increased our
vulnerability to unwanted intrusion without erasing our expectations of privacy,
confidentiality and security. Legislative proposals in England and legislation
elsewhere have tended to focus on the new machines themselves, while the courts,
viewing problems on a case-by-case basis, have reminded us of the human motives
giving rise to privacy invasion and privacy protection. These motives do not seem
to have changed very much as new ways of creating, transmitting and storing
information have replaced the handwritten letter and the manila file folder.
New legal ideas also contribute to the growing importance of privacy in the
courts. The language of human rights permeates legal discourse from the
international level to the confines of the family. Everybody has rights, and privacy
is one of the fundamental human rights gaining widespread acceptance. Critics of
the right to privacy point out its 'newness', but as this article has shown, the
common law roots of the right run deep in the realms of private property and
confidential communications. By recognizing a unified law of privacy, the courts
can gradually develop and define the boundaries around the private life in these
realms and the newly-important realm of personal information. The requirement
of a search warrant can be rendered more effective if the police are not permitted
to join peeping Toms at the window-sill. The exclusion of marital confidences in
testimony can be extended to a privilege against their disclosure through
eavesdroppers and intercepted letters. The action for breach of confidence can be
strengthened by establishing that the press, in publishing such confidences, is not
completely immune from restraint. The right to privacy, now a fixture of English
law, will prove fruitful for decades to come.

